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I. INTRODUCTION 
Criminal cases are fraught with the risk of conflicting interests.1  For 
example, a conflict can arise when one attorney represents two or more 
defendants in the same proceeding, or when defense counsel previously 
represented either the victim or a prosecution witness.2   In such 
situations, are defense attorneys well-suited to determine whether a 
conflict exists or is likely?  Or are there reasons to doubt whether 
attorneys can assess the risks of divided loyalties, both prospectively 
when deciding the likelihood of a conflict, and retrospectively when 
testifying about whether they provided constitutionally effective 
representation?3 
                                                     
 ∗  Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor, Hofstra University School of Law.  Copyright Tigran 
W. Eldred 2009.  This article was written when I taught as a Clinical Law Professor at Lewis & 
Clark Law School.  Special thanks to Bruce Green, Juliet Stumpf, Bridget McCormack, Michael 
Pinard, Megan Chaney, Barb Fedders, Jenny Roberts, Susan Mandiberg and Jennifer Stumpf for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  Thanks also to Lewis & Clark Law School for 
funding support; to the organizers of New York University School of Law’s Clinical Writer’s 
Workshop, where I presented an earlier version of this paper; and to my research assistants, Lauren 
Kemp and Lais Washington. 
 1. Conflicts of interest are frequently litigated in criminal cases.  For example, Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), a seminal decision on conflicts in criminal cases, has been cited 1137 
times in the last five years (based on May 22, 2009 Westlaw search limited to state and federal cases, 
run with date restriction of February 22, 2004).  Limiting the search to Westlaw Headnotes nineteen 
and twenty-one (which focus on the applicable standard of review to determine whether a conflict of 
interest resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel, see infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text), 
there have been 693 case citations during the same period.  For a discussion of the ratio of alleged to 
actual conflicts of interest, see infra text of note 192. 
 2. For discussion of the most common scenarios that present risks of a conflict, see infra notes 
28–55 and accompanying text. 
 3. Commentary on the right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, is voluminous.  For a sampling of recent scholarship, see Rebecca Klaren & Irene 
Merker Rosenberg, Splitting Hairs in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases: An Essay on How 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine Undermines the Prohibition Against Executing the 
Mentally Retarded, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 339 (2004); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in 
Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679 
(2007); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test 
for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77 (2007). 
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Mickens v. Taylor,4 the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
conflicts of interest in criminal cases, places these questions in context.  
The defendant, Walter Mickens, was charged with the murder and 
attempted forced sodomy of seventeen-year-old Timothy Hall.5  
Unbeknownst to Mickens, his appointed attorney, Bryan Saunders, had 
been representing the victim on unrelated criminal charges at the time of 
the murder.6  Saunders did not disclose his prior representation of the 
victim, which only became known years later, well after Mickens had 
been convicted and sentenced to death for the crime. 
Mickens filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court alleging 
that Saunders had a conflict of interest that justified a new trial.7  Of the 
many claims, one stands out: the allegation that Saunders had failed, due 
to his prior representation of the victim, to investigate whether the victim 
had been a male prostitute who consented to sexual relations with 
Mickens before the murder.8  The importance of a consent defense was 
                                                     
 4. 535 U.S. 162 (2002).  Mickens has received extensive scrutiny.  See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, 
Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel’s Ethical Duty to the Capital Defendant, 
31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181 (2003); John Capone, Note, Facilitating Fairness: The Judge’s Role in 
the Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Counsel, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881 (2003); Jeffrey 
Scott Glassman, Note, Mickens v. Taylor: The Court’s New Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Policy for 
Attorneys Faced with a Conflict of Interest, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 919 (2004); 
Hadassah Reimer, Case Note, Legal Ethics: Stabbed in the Back, But No Adverse Effect, Mickens v. 
Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), 3 WYO. L. REV. 329 (2003); Patrice McGuire Sabach, Note, 
Rethinking Unwaivable Conflicts of Interest After United States v. Schwartz and Mickens v. Taylor, 
59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89 (2003); Mark W. Shiner, Note, Conflicts of Interest Challenges 
Post Mickens v. Taylor: Redressing the Defendant’s Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and 
Personal Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 965 (2003). 
 5. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 164.  Post-conviction counsel admitted that the evidence that Mickens 
had committed the murder was “strong.”  See Brief for Petitioner at *3, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 
162 (2002) No. 00-9285, 2001 WL 930725 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  The facts of the case, 
as found by the Virginia Supreme Court and adopted by the federal courts in deciding the habeas 
petition, were as follows: The victim was found lying nude from the waist down on a mattress under 
a sheet of plywood and had been stabbed 143 times.  Id. at *2.  After his arrest, Mickens made 
incriminating statements on multiple occasions; the victim’s shoes were found in the possession of 
someone who had bought them from Mickens; and forensic evidence found at the scene, including 
semen, blood, and saliva on cigarette butts, were tested for DNA, which either matched or did not 
exclude Mickens.  See Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 589–93 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d en 
banc, 240 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). 
 6. See Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 599–600. 
 7. Id. at 592.  The petition alleged a number of constitutional violations, including that 
Saunders’s conflict of interest had caused him to: (1) refrain from investigating and asserting a 
consent defense to the charge of attempted sodomy, which would have eliminated the statutory basis 
for the death penalty; (2) fail to investigate or raise negative information about Hall; (3) fail to 
engage in meaningful plea negotiations; and (4) fail to present evidence about Hall as mitigating 
information at the sentencing proceeding.  Id. at 606. 
 8. Id. at 606–08.  During the habeas proceedings, Mickens cited the following evidentiary 
support for a consent defense, claiming it was sufficient to warrant an investigation into whether the 
victim had been a male prostitute: a newspaper clipping indicating that the area where the body had 
been found was known as a place where “male homosexuals frequent”; no defensive stab wounds on 
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evident: to impose the death penalty, the jury was required by statute to 
find that the murder had occurred during the commission of attempted 
forced sodomy, meaning that a finding of consent would have eliminated 
the possibility of a death sentence.9  Mickens argued that Saunders failed 
to investigate a consent defense out of loyalty to the victim.10 
Saunders testified during the habeas proceedings that, in his opinion, 
his ethical duties to the victim had ended at the victim’s death, that he 
had obtained no confidential information from the victim, and that his 
prior representation of the victim had not influenced his decisions on 
behalf of Mickens.11  On the issue of consent, Saunders testified that he 
did not consider the defense because Mickens had maintained his 
innocence and had never suggested that the sexual activity was 
consensual.12 
The habeas court concluded that Saunders had been “remarkably 
wrong” in calculating his ethical duties.13  Nevertheless, it “accord[ed] 
great weight” to Saunders’s claim that his prior representation of the 
victim had not “hampered” his work on behalf of Mickens.14  On the 
issue of consent, the court agreed with Saunders that Mickens’s 
persistent claim of innocence had foreclosed a consent defense.15  Based 
                                                                                                                       
the victim’s body; forensic evidence from the mattress on which the victim’s body had been found 
indicated the presence of pubic hair from several different people, suggesting that it had been 
frequently used for sexual relations; the area where the crime had been committed was known for 
prostitution; and the victim had been killed at the base of an embankment, where it would have been 
difficult to lead someone involuntarily.  Id. at 606–07. 
 9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(5) (West 2001). 
 10. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at 39–41.  According to Mickens’s post-conviction 
counsel, Saunders obtained information from the victim that would have prompted a non-conflicted 
attorney to start an investigation, including that, at the time of the murder, the victim had been living 
away from home, had been in state custody, and had been assigned a state social worker.  Id. at 39–
44.  Mickens’s post-conviction lawyers also claimed that Saunders knew, but did not disclose, why 
the victim had been placed in state custody.  Id. at 39. 
 11. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
 12. Id. at 608. 
 13. Id. at 605 (noting that Saunders’s duty to protect Hall’s confidences continued past death) 
(citing Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)).  The court also found that it was 
“inconceivable” that Saunders had obtained no confidential information from the victim.  Greene, 74 
F. Supp. 2d at 606. 
 14. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
 15. Id. at 606–07.  Remarkably, the district court did not analyze the obvious counter-argument 
to this position: namely, that Mickens’s insistence on his own innocence might have been thawed by 
advice of a non-conflicted lawyer who had investigated the defense and, based on the results, had 
explained to Mickens that a consent defense would have the best chance of staving off a sentence of 
death.  See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179–83 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Saunders’s decision to conceal his prior representation of the victim, and the truncated investigation 
that followed, made it impossible for Saunders to develop the type of trusting relationship that would 
have prompted truthful disclosures by Mickens about his responsibility for Hall’s death).  In 
addition, the habeas court noted that other evidence undermined the claim of consensual sex, 
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on these findings, and after addressing the remaining claims of error, the 
court denied relief. 16  The Supreme Court affirmed.17 
Mickens raises two important questions about defense lawyers in 
conflicts cases.  First, can lawyers such as Saunders be depended upon to 
make accurate judgments about whether a conflict exists or is likely?  On 
this question, the Supreme Court, which has been the main authority on 
the matter, has made inconsistent statements in different cases.  When 
formulating rules for conflicts that are alleged before or during 
representation, the Court has expressed distrust in the competence of 
defense lawyers to guarantee effective assistance of counsel.  As a result, 
the Court has vested trial courts with broad discretion to disqualify 
counsel to protect against conflicts that can arise.18 
The Court’s views have been very different, however, when defining 
standards for post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Under the current standard, a defendant who seeks to overturn a 
conviction on conflicts grounds must prove, in most cases, that a conflict 
had an adverse effect on the quality of representation provided.19  In 
developing this test, the Court has expressed confidence in the abilities of 
defense lawyers, noting that trial courts must “necessarily rely in large 
measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel” and 
that defense attorneys are in the “best position” to evaluate whether a 
conflict exists or is likely.20 
                                                                                                                       
including evidence of a choke hold on the victim’s neck and evidence of bloody transfer stains 
suggesting that the perpetrator stabbed the victim during attempted sexual activity.  See Greene, 74 
F. Supp. 2d at 607.  Because Saunders did not investigate the possibility of a consent defense, there 
is no way to know whether this evidence would have withstood careful investigation and 
examination.  In this regard, the court’s analysis is an example of the inherent problems of after-the-
fact review in ineffectiveness cases identified by Justice Marshall in Strickland v. Washington, the 
seminal decision regarding the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.  See 466 
U.S. 668, 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that assessing prejudice based on the record 
developed at trial is an inherently suspect act of bootstrapping, since the record under review was 
produced by the very attorney whose conduct is alleged to have been ineffective).  For a detailed 
discussion and elaboration of this critique, see Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 
The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 278–86 (1997). 
 16. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 615. 
 17. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 176.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Mickens was based, in large 
measure, on its interpretation of precedent.  See infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988).  For discussion of Wheat, see infra 
notes 58–65 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348–50 (1980).  A limited exception to the Sullivan 
adverse effects test applies when defense counsel objected to representing conflicting interests, but 
the trial court failed to inquire into whether a conflict was present.  Id. at 348.  In such situations, 
reversal is automatic without any showing of prejudice.  See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 
485–90 (1978).  See infra notes 67–71 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 345–47; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485–86. 
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A second question arises when defense attorneys such as Saunders 
testify in post-conviction proceedings: can lawyers be expected to make 
accurate retrospective assessments about whether they rendered effective 
assistance of counsel?  On this point, some have suggested that defense 
lawyers will succumb to psychological biases when testifying.  For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
stated: 
[A]fter-the-fact testimony by a lawyer who was precluded by a conflict 
of interest from pursuing a strategy or tactic is not helpful.  Even the 
most candid persons may be able to convince themselves that they 
actually would not have used that strategy or tactic anyway, when the 
alternative is a confession of ineffective assistance resulting from 
ethical limitations.21 
Which of these many claims about defense lawyers is accurate?  Too 
often, the tendency has been to make “generalizations about the ethical 
probity of defense lawyers,”22 and then to draw conclusions about how 
they will respond when confronted with difficult questions such as 
conflicts of interest.23  Indeed, despite the many assertions about defense 
lawyers, no attempt has been made to assess empirical evidence on how 
they actually respond to conflicts of interest in criminal cases. 
                                                     
 21. United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1995).  See also United States v. 
Shwayder, 312 F.3d 1109, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Human self-perception regarding one’s own 
motives for particular actions in difficult circumstances is too faulty to be relied upon, even if the 
individual reporting is telling the truth as he perceives it.”).  A group of legal ethics experts made a 
similar suggestion in Mickens, arguing as amicus curiae that Saunders suffered “subconscious” 
divided loyalties caused by conflicting interests.  See Brief of Legal Ethicists and the Stein Center 
for Law and Ethics as Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner at *15, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 
(2002) No. 00-9285, 2001 WL 881242 [hereinafter Brief of Legal Ethicists]. 
 22. Bruce A. Green, “Through A Glass Darkly”: How the Court Sees Motions to Disqualify 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1228 (1989). 
 23. One major exception is Leonard Gross from Southern Illinois University, who has studied 
empirical evidence on how lawyers behave when conflicts of interest are present.  See Leonard E. 
Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest Rules Consistent with Principles of 
Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 111 (2006).  Gross addresses whether the ethical 
duties that bind lawyers should be modified to reflect the psychological biases that can distort 
judgment caused by conflicts of interest.  Id. at 125.  His conclusion is that lawyers are subject to 
distorting biases of judgment that make it hard to respond objectively to conflicts of interest.  Id. at 
125–33.  While Gross covers similar terrain as the research cited in this article, his work does not 
focus on the particular types of conflicts that arise in criminal cases, nor the relevance of 
psychological data on legal standards that should apply in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment.  His work is very useful, however, in assessing the degree to which the 
rules of professional responsibility act as a check to psychological biases confronting lawyers in 
conflicts cases.  See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text. 
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This Article fills the gap in existing scholarship by applying 
psychological research from the field of behavioral economics24 to the 
types of decisions that lawyers make to resolve conflicts of interest in 
criminal cases.  The evidence, it turns out, is quite revealing.  
Researchers have uncovered psychological biases that make it extremely 
difficult for professionals, even those who are acting in good faith and 
whose only limitation is unconscious, to appreciate the deleterious 
consequences of conflicts of interest.25  In other words, while the 
“venal”26 lawyer may, from time to time, intentionally seek to obscure 
evidence of a conflict of interest, or the harmful effects that a conflict 
had during representation, psychological research demonstrates that most 
lawyers—even those who are acting with the best intentions—are unable 
consciously to identify many conflicts that exist or to appreciate the 
corrosive effects that such conflicts may have on decision making.  
Indeed, like all professionals, lawyers systematically understate both the 
existence of conflicts and their deleterious effects. 
This Article is divided into three parts.  Part II reviews the types of 
conflicts of interest that can arise in criminal cases and analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, with an emphasis on 
assumptions about whether defense lawyers are well-suited to resolve 
conflicts of interest.  It also reviews the importance of defense attorney 
testimony in resolving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Part III explores the psychological biases that cause lawyers 
                                                     
 24. Behavioral economics has been defined as the field that “attempts to incorporate the vast 
knowledge accumulated by cognitive and social scientists into predictive models” of human 
behavior. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs 
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2098–99 (2008) (reviewing RICHARD H. THALER & 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 
(2008) and DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008)).  As a noted scholar has stated, “[T]here is little doubt that the major new 
theoretical approach to law and economics in the past two decades does not come from either of 
these two fields.  Instead it comes from the adjacent discipline of cognitive psychology, which has 
now morphed into behavioral economics.”  Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of 
Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 803 (2008).  For a description of the research trends in 
this area, including the application of behavioral economics to various areas of legal study, see infra 
notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 25. See, e.g., Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing 
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 74, 77 (Don A. Moore et al., eds., 2005) (arguing 
that conflicts of interest result not from “explicit dishonesty,” but rather because “individuals view 
themselves as moral, competent, and deserving, and this view obstructs their ability to see and 
recognize conflicts of interest when they occur”); Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-
Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 189 
(2004) (applying a dual process model to explain how conflicts of interest arise between automatic 
self-interest and one’s ethical and professional obligations to others).  See infra notes 109–42 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 205 n.10 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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systematically to underestimate the existence and influence of conflicting 
interests.  It concludes that lawyers tend to be poor judges of conflicts of 
interest, both prospectively when assessing whether a conflict does or 
will exist, and retrospectively when assessing whether there was a 
conflict that had an adverse effect on the quality of representation 
provided.  The implications of these findings are addressed in Part IV, 
which reviews options to address the reality of how lawyers respond to 
conflicts in criminal cases.  It concludes that, because lawyers are not 
well-suited to evaluate conflicting interests, a new approach is necessary 
to reduce the importance of the testimony of the lawyer whose conduct is 
under scrutiny when a conflict has been alleged. 
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CRIMINAL CASES 
Identifying and resolving complex questions raised by conflicts of 
interest can be vexing, even for a highly competent lawyer. 27  In criminal 
cases, where an attorney must often balance delicate and competing 
concerns, the possibility of a conflict is often present.  The first challenge 
confronting the lawyer is to gather enough information from clients and 
other sources to determine whether a conflict exists or is likely.  Next, 
the lawyer must apply the relevant ethical rules of professional conduct, 
which themselves are complex.  This section reviews the types of 
situations that are ripe for conflicts in criminal cases—including cases of 
multiple representation, successive representation and conflicts arising 
from a lawyer’s personal interests—and the ethical issues involved.  It 
also reviews the Supreme Court’s treatment of conflicts in criminal 
cases, with a focus on the Court’s views about the competence of defense 
lawyers to resolve conflicts of interest that can arise, and the central role 
that testimony by defense counsel plays in post-conviction proceedings. 
A. Diagnosing Conflicts of Interest 
Like all lawyers, criminal defense attorneys are charged with the 
duty to identify and resolve conflicts of interest that occur during 
representation.  Much of the challenge in exercising this professional 
                                                     
 27. Many have described the complex nature of conflicts of interest.  See, e.g., NATHAN M. 
CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 148 (2d 
ed. 2000) (“Conflicts of interest present some of the most pervasive and difficult ethical problems 
that lawyers face in practice.”); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 230 (6th ed. 2002) 
(“It is probably safe to say that conflicts of interest present some of the most complex problems in 
the area of legal ethics.”); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 255 (2004) 
(describing the rules on conflicts as “intricate, technical, and arcane”). 
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responsibility requires a lawyer to gather relevant information from 
clients and other relevant sources.  For example, multiple 
representation28—which by nature is rife with conflicts of interest—
requires a lawyer to make exceedingly careful evaluations to determine 
whether conflict-free representation is possible.29  Does the evidence 
indicate that one defendant might be less culpable than others, creating 
the possibility that a plea bargain might benefit one defendant at the 
expense of others?  Do the defendants have antagonistic defenses?  Is it 
in the best interest of one defendant to testify, while another should 
remain silent, which might signal to the jury that the silent defendant has 
something to hide?  These are just some of the questions that must be 
answered to determine whether an attorney can represent more than one 
defendant in a criminal proceeding.30 
Even when the interests of the clients are aligned before trial, 
information that becomes known as the case proceeds can create a 
conflict that previously did not exist.  For example, a lawyer who 
planned a joint defense strategy claiming that no defendant was involved 
in the crime might have to re-think the strategy if the trial evidence is 
much stronger against one defendant than others.  Or the clients 
themselves might decide to disclose information not previously known to 
the attorney that creates an incongruity of interest.  These and other  
 
                                                     
 28. Multiple or joint representation refers to a situation where one lawyer represents two or 
more defendants who are jointly charged with criminal activity.  See generally JOHN M. BURKOFF, 
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW AND LIABILITY § 6:10 (2004).  Defense lawyers can also have 
conflicts caused by other simultaneous obligations.  For example, a defense lawyer who 
simultaneously works as a part-time prosecutor, or whose fee is being paid by a third party, may 
have a conflict of interest.  Id. §§ 6:11, :18.  For a good description of conflicts of interest in criminal 
cases, see ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO 
TOUGH QUESTIONS 233–308 (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995). 
 29. Because of the significant risk of conflicts in cases of multiple representation, the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure require trial courts to take steps to protect the rights of defendants.  See 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c)(2) (“The court must promptly inquire about the propriety of joint 
representation and must personally advise each defendant of the right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, including separate representation.  Unless there is good cause to believe that no conflict of 
interest is likely to arise, the court must take appropriate measures to protect each defendant’s right 
to counsel.”).  Other authorities have noted these dangers.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R.1.7 cmt. 23 (2008) (“The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple 
defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more 
than one codefendant.”); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: The Prosecution Function and The 
Defense Function, § 4-3.5(c) (3d ed. 1993) (suggesting similar cautions). 
 30. For an excellent discussion of the types of situations that can give rise to conflicts of 
interest in cases of multiple representation, see John Stewart Geer, Representation of Multiple 
Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense 
Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119, 125–40 (1978); see also Green, supra note 22, at 1203–04. 
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circumstances can change the calculations the lawyer must make in 
assessing the risk of conflict.31 
Lawyers must also determine whether, as in Mickens,32 a conflict 
exists between current and former clients, a situation commonly known 
as the problem of successive representation.33  For example, if defense 
counsel previously represented the victim, or a witness who will be 
testifying for the prosecution, the lawyer must decide whether 
confidential information was gained in the prior representation.  If so, 
will the former client testify to matters that would normally require the 
lawyer to use previously obtained confidential information as a source 
for cross-examination?34  Does the representation of the prior client make 
it harder for the defense attorney to seek a favorable plea bargain for the 
defendant?  Or will the lawyer be able to represent the defendant’s best 
interests despite the prior representation?35 
Personal interests of the lawyer can also result in conflicts.  For 
example, the lawyer must carefully assess whether the case will generate 
                                                     
 31. Some have proposed a checklist of relevant circumstances a lawyer should investigate in 
deciding whether multiple representation is permissible.  See RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM 
H. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS § 14.3.1 (1988) (“1. Is one defendant more culpable than the other?  If 
so, conflict is almost inevitable, either because the prosecution will offer a deal to the one less 
culpable or because distinctions will need to be drawn during the case.  2. Are the defenses 
inconsistent in any way?  3. Will one testify and the other not?  A defendant who testifies inevitably 
calls attention to the failure of the other defendant to take the stand.  The problem is exacerbated by 
joint representation.  4. Will the prosecution’s evidence strike the defendants unequally?  If a 
prosecution witness implicates A but not B, the attorney is put in the position of attacking the witness 
on behalf of A but implying that he is telling the truth about B.  5. Should distinctions be drawn in 
closing argument?  The attorney representing codefendants cannot do so.  6. Should distinctions be 
drawn at sentencing, either because of relative culpability or the different backgrounds of the 
defendants?”); see also CRYSTAL, supra note 27, at 152 (quoting a similar version of the checklist). 
 32. See supra notes 4–17 and accompanying text. 
 33. For the seminal discussion of conflicts of interest that can arise in cases of successive 
representation, see Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE 
L.J. 1 (1983); see also BURKOFF, supra note 28, at §§ 7:1–9. 
 34. As the Court noted in Moss v. United States: 
  The fear in successive representation cases is that the lawyer will fail to cross-
examine the former client rigorously for fear of revealing or misusing privileged 
information.  Thus, the most common example of an actual conflict of interest arising 
from successive representation occurs where an attorney’s former client serves as a 
government witness against the attorney’s current client at trial. 
323 F.3d 445, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
 35. There will, of course, be situations where the defense attorney need not utilize confidential 
information obtained from a former client to advance the interests of the current client.  For example, 
the interests of the former and current clients may be aligned, meaning that there is no need to 
impeach the former client on the witness stand.  In addition, even when the attorney is obligated to 
impeach the former client, the confidential information obtained during the prior representation may 
duplicate other information readily available, again making it unlikely that the lawyer will need to 
utilize the confidential information in cross-examination.  Green, supra note 22, at 1219–20 nn.86–
87. 
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media attention and, if so, whether the benefits of media exposure will 
create incentives for the lawyer that might be adverse to the interests of 
the defendant.36  Other personal interests, such as the economic incentive 
to secure attorney fees,37 can give rise to conflicts that need careful 
scrutiny.38 
The difficulty in gathering information is compounded by the nature 
of a criminal proceeding.  As the Supreme Court has noted, in criminal 
cases defendants may fail to provide complete and accurate versions of 
events to attorneys, especially at the early stages of representation when 
the attorney-client relationship has just been formed.39  The frequency 
with which information is hidden from lawyers is impossible to know; 
but, it is reasonable to assume that many lawyers will find it hard to 
gather all they need from a client when making a conflicts calculation 
and will, therefore, need to investigate other sources of information 
before making any final determination. 
Once relevant information is obtained, the defense lawyer must 
decide whether, under the circumstances, there is a conflict under the 
governing rules of the profession—which in almost all jurisdictions are 
based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.40  As others have 
noted, except in those few situations where conduct is flatly prohibited, 
the duty in every case is to determine the degree of risk that the lawyer’s 
ability to properly function will be impaired.41 
The notion that conflicts are about assessing risk is at the foundation 
of the ethical rules.42  For example, under Model Rule 1.7, which 
                                                     
 36. For the type of high profile case that could result in a conflict of interest, see Beets v. Scott, 
65 F.3d 1258, 1261–62 (5th Cir. 1995) (defense attorney accepted reduced fee to represent a client 
accused of killing multiple former husbands in exchange for obtaining media rights to the case). 
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 91–92, 110 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing 
conviction where defense counsel was paid by police union to represent police officers accused of 
crimes). 
 38. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) provides a list of situations that 
can give rise to conflicts caused by the personal interests of the lawyer.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.8.  See also BURKOFF, supra note 28, at §§ 6:13–16.  Most commentators agree that 
the Model Rules provide a better formulation of conflicts of interest than did earlier sources of 
regulatory authority.  See Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407, 407 
n.2 (1998). 
 39. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1988). 
 40. Only California has resisted adopting a version of the Model Rules.  See ABAnet.org, 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Dates of Adoption, http://www.abanet.org/cpr 
/mrpc/chron_states.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2009) (listing the jurisdictions adopting a version of 
the Model Rules). 
 41. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 10.4 
(2004); Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflicts of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 823, 874 (1992). 
 42. The rules governing professional conduct define the circumstances that can give rise to 
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governs conflicts with current clients, a conflict exists when “there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or a personal interest of the lawyer.”43  
Situations involving successive representation also involve risk 
assessment.  Under Model Rule 1.9, a lawyer must determine whether 
representation of a former client was “substantially related” to 
representation of the current client’s matter, which in turn requires 
analysis of whether “there is a substantial risk that confidential factual 
information as would normally have been obtained in the prior 
representation would materially advance the client’s position in the 
subsequent matter.”44  If so, and the interests of the current and former 
clients are materially adverse, a conflict exists.45 
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers combines the rules 
relating to conflicts of interest into a single standard that focuses on risk.  
“A conflict of interest is involved if there is a substantial risk that the 
lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially and adversely 
affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to 
another current client, a former client, or a third person.”46 
The inquiry whether a conflict exists under this formulation is 
measured according to an objective standard, meaning that a lawyer’s 
conclusions will be evaluated based on the “facts and circumstances that 
the lawyer knew or should have known at the time of undertaking or 
continuing a representation.”47 
                                                                                                                       
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys.  They do not define the standard of care owed to a client 
for the purpose of assessing professional malpractice, or whether a defendant received effective 
assistance of counsel.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope cmt. 20 (2008); 
BURKOFF, supra note 28, §§ 1.7, 2.9–10. 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2). 
 44. Id. cmt. 3.  For a list of states that have adopted the comments to the Model Rules, see 
ABAnet.org, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/cpr 
/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2009). 
 45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (2008).  As currently drafted, there is 
some confusion whether a former client who is a witness against a current client in a criminal 
proceeding can be said to be “adverse” so as to invoke the prohibitions of Rule 1.9.  See Green, 
supra note 22, at 1217–19.  Most courts have concluded that there is adversity simply because the 
former client will be testifying against the interests of the present client.  Id. 
 46. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2001).  According to 
the comment, under the Restatement an “adverse” effect refers to the “quality of the representation, 
not necessarily the quality of the result obtained in a given case.”  Id. § 121 cmt. c(i).  In other 
words, a conflict will exist when there is sufficient risk that divided loyalties or interests will 
adversely affect representation, irrespective of whether the feared result occurs. 
 47. Id. § 121 cmt. c(iv).  Given the risks involved in multiple representation of defendants by a 
single lawyer, the Restatement concludes that multiple representation always constitutes a conflict of 
interest that is prohibited, unless all affected clients provide informed consent.  Id. § 129. 
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Placing risk at the center of conflicts analysis results in an important 
point that can be overlooked: as a matter of professional ethics, a conflict 
of interest exists even if the feared eventuality never materializes.  In 
other words, a conflict is present if there is sufficient risk of resulting 
impairment, irrespective of whether the lawyer’s ability to function is 
ever adversely affected by the circumstances.48  A lawyer who 
determines that the risk of conflict is sufficient to trigger the 
prescriptions of the ethical rules must, therefore, resolve the ethical 
matter at the time the risk becomes realized, and not wait until 
representation becomes compromised.  This standard of conduct stands 
in stark contrast to the standard governing post-conviction claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which in 
most cases requires proof that the lawyer’s conduct was, in fact, 
adversely affected by the circumstances that produced the conflicting 
interests.49 
Once a conflict is identified, the lawyer’s work is not done.  In some 
instances, it may be in the client’s best interest to waive the conflict to 
permit the lawyer to continue representation in the matter.50  The lawyer 
must decide whether the conflict is the type that can be waived,51 and if 
so must obtain the client’s informed consent,52 which requires sufficient 
information so that the client can evaluate both the material risks 
involved and the alternatives that are available.53  This includes 
determining whether, despite the conflict, the lawyer can competently 
and diligently represent the client,54 and whether informed consent can 
be obtained from the affected clients in writing.55 
                                                     
 48. See HAZARD, JR. & HODES, supra note 41, § 10–12 (“In the modern view, a conflict of 
interest exists whenever the attorney-client relationship or the quality of the representation is ‘at 
risk,’ even if no substantive impropriety—such as the breach of confidentiality or less than zealous 
representation—in fact eventuates.”).  For the seminal discussion of these issues, see McMunigal, 
supra note 41, at 826–33; see also Kevin C. McMunigal, Comment: Multi-Disciplinary Practice and 
Conflict of Interest, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 999 (2002). 
 49. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text. 
 50. For a good discussion of the many issues involved in waiving conflicts of interest, see 
Zacharias, supra note 38, at 436. 
 51. See id. at 1.7(b)(3); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2008) (stating when the 
conflict cannot be waived no matter the client’s wishes). 
 52. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4), 1.9(a). 
 53. See id. R. 1.7(b) & 1.9(a); R. 1.0(e) (stating informed consent “denotes the agreement by a 
person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and 
explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course 
of conduct”). 
 54. Id. R. 1.7(b)(1).  A conflict cannot be waived when the representation requires one client to 
assert a claim against another client in the same proceeding.  Id. R. 1.7(b)(3). 
 55. Id. R. 1.7(b)(4). 
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In sum, a lawyer in a conflicts situation faces multiple complex 
tasks.  The rules of professional conduct assume that lawyers can, 
through rational deliberation, make these assessments competently.  But 
do others make the same assumption?  As the next section discusses, the 
Supreme Court has adopted standards in conflicts cases that rely on 
inconsistent views about the abilities of defense lawyers to address and 
resolve conflicts of interest that arise during representation in criminal 
cases. 
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has addressed three interrelated questions 
concerning conflicts of interest in criminal cases, each of which focuses 
on the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.56  First, 
what amount of discretion should a trial court possess in deciding 
whether to disqualify a defense lawyer because of a conflict of interest?  
Second, under what circumstances does the trial court have a duty to 
inquire whether the defense attorney has a conflict of interest?  Third, 
what must a defendant prove to obtain relief from a conviction based on 
a conflict of interest? 
The answers to these questions reveal the Court’s opinion about the 
abilities and willingness of defense lawyers to resolve conflicts of 
interest in criminal cases.  Curiously, the Court has expressed 
inconsistent views—on the one hand showing little confidence in defense 
lawyers to resolve conflicts when defining the rules that apply 
prospectively, that is, when a conflict is alleged before or during 
representation; on the other hand, concluding that defense attorneys are 
well-suited to resolve conflicts when defining the rules that apply 
retrospectively, that is, when a defendant brings a post-conviction claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1. Skepticism About Defense Attorneys 
The Supreme Court expressed skepticism about the abilities of 
defense lawyers in Wheat v. United States,57 the case that decided the 
amount of discretion trial courts possess to disqualify defense lawyers on 
conflict grounds.58  The prosecutor in Wheat objected to the defendant’s 
                                                     
 56. See infra notes 57–84 and accompanying text. 
 57. 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 
 58. Id. at 163. 
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request to retain a lawyer, arguing that the lawyer had a conflict of 
interest.59  The defendant was willing to waive the conflict, which 
defense counsel claimed the prosecution had manufactured for tactical 
advantage.60  Concerned about what it called a “whip-saw” effect—
whereby the defendant asserts a right to waive a conflict before trial but 
then asserts after trial that the conflict rendered assistance of counsel 
ineffective—the Court concluded that trial courts must be afforded 
“substantial latitude” in deciding whether to accept waivers in cases 
where there is either an “actual” or “potential” conflict of interest.61 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court in Wheat derided the ability 
of defense attorneys to assess and resolve conflicts of interest.  
According to the Court, conflicts are “notoriously hard to predict” in the 
pre-trial stage of proceedings, both because clients often fail to disclose 
the entire truth to their attorneys and because the disclosure of new facts 
can change the calculus at any time.62  As a result of these 
“imponderables,” the Court stated that attorneys will find it “difficult” to 
assess the risk of conflict “and even more difficult” to communicate 
those risks effectively to a client who must make the waiver decision.63  
In addition, the Court stated that attorneys who are willing to seek 
waivers may fail to take appropriate care in communicating all of the 
                                                     
 59. Id. at 155.  The defendant in Wheat was charged, along with other co-defendants, in a large 
scale drug conspiracy.  Id. at 154.  An attorney named Iredale represented two of the co-defendants, 
both of whom agreed to plead guilty.  Id. at 155.  Shortly before the defendant’s trial, the defendant 
sought to hire Iredale as counsel.  Id.  The prosecution objected, claiming that Iredale had a conflict 
of interest, principally because one of Iredale’s other clients might be called as a witness in the 
defendant’s trial.  Id. at 156.  The prosecution also claimed that the defendant might be required to 
testify against another of Iredale’s clients if plea negotiations that were under way broke down.  Id. 
at 155–56. 
 60. Id. at 157.  For criticism of the Court’s analysis of the likelihood of a conflict under these 
facts, see Green, supra note 22, at 1221–22 (concluding that the Court misunderstood the ethical 
rules); see also Michael E. Lubowitz, Note, The Right to Counsel of Choice After Wheat v. United 
States: Whose Choice Is It?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (1990) (“Following Wheat, a defendant’s 
waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel, in favor of a particular attorney, can be denied for purely 
speculative reasons.”). 
 61. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163; see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 n.3, 
150 (2006) (noting that violations of the right to counsel of choice are structural, requiring no proof 
of prejudice, but reaffirming that trial courts retain broad discretion to disqualify counsel based on a 
conflict of interest).  Wheat did not define the line that divides “actual” versus “potential” conflicts 
of interest.  Elsewhere, the Court has concluded that an “‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment 
purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.”  Mickens v. Taylor, 
535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002).  For criticism of the linguistic distinction between “potential” and 
“actual” conflicts, see McMunigal, supra note 41, at 846–47; MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE 
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, § 10.10 (3d ed. 2004). 
 62. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162–63.  Others have also described the natural tendency of defendants 
to insist on their innocence, even when there is strong evidence to the contrary, at the early stages of 
representation.  See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 61, § 10.10. 
 63. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163. 
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salient facts of the situation.64  While the Court did not expound upon 
this accusation, one possibility is that the Court was suggesting that a 
lawyer who has a conflict of interest will be motivated by economic 
incentives to encourage waiver whenever possible.65  Together, these 
views indicate distrust that lawyers can identify conflicts and 
communicate about them in a way that protects the rights of 
defendants.66 
2. Optimism About Defense Attorneys 
In contrast to Wheat, the Supreme Court has made favorable 
comments about defense lawyers in a series of cases defining the 
standards that apply when a defendant seeks post-conviction relief under 
the Sixth Amendment.  For example, in Holloway v. Arkansas,67 the 
defendant sought relief from a conviction because the trial court had 
forced his attorney to represent multiple defendants with incongruent 
interests.  The Supreme Court concluded that defense attorneys are “‘in 
the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a 
conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a 
trial.’”68  In addition, the Court noted that lawyers have ethical 
obligations to bring conflicts to the trial court’s attention69 and can be 
relied upon to do so truthfully because, as officers of the court, they 
make statements effectively “under oath.”70  The Court then created a 
bright-line rule: when defense counsel objects to representing multiple 
                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. A number of Supreme Court justices have made similar suggestions in other cases.  See, 
e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 204–05 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting reason to 
believe that defense counsel suppressed the conflict of interest for sake of a fee and publicity 
surrounding the case); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 806 n.11 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the defense lawyer may have ignored a conflict because he had an interest in preserving 
his ability to obtain future fees); see also Green, supra note 22, at 1228 (noting that “a retained 
attorney’s financial stake in the representation may create a disincentive to comply with the 
particular standards governing conflicts”); Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 37 (making the same 
argument and citing lower court opinions on point). 
 66. See Green, supra note 22, at 1228. 
 67. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
 68. Id. at 485 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973)).  
While the Court did not explain this conclusion, one possibility is that the defense attorney may be 
the only person with access to confidential information needed to decide whether a conflict exists or 
is likely. 
 69. Id. at 485–86 (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.5(b) (1974)). 
 70. Id. at 486.  The Court rejected the notion advanced by the prosecution that “unscrupulous” 
defense attorneys would mislead trial courts into believing that non-existent conflicts were present.  
Id. 
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clients with conflicting interests, the trial court must, at a minimum, 
inquire into the basis of the defense objection and the failure to do so will 
result in automatic reversal of any resulting conviction.71 
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,72 where one defense attorney was hired to 
represent multiple defendants in different proceedings, but who did not 
object that there was a conflict of interest, the Court reiterated its view 
that attorneys are in the “best position” to resolve conflicts and are 
ethically obligated to do so.73  In addition, the Court noted that trial 
courts must “necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and 
good judgment of defense counsel” in assessing whether a conflict exists 
or will arise.74  The Court then concluded that a trial court will be 
required to inquire whether a conflict exists only when defense counsel 
informs the court of a conflict, or when other circumstances put the court 
on notice that a particular conflict is present.75  In addition, when defense 
counsel does not object, any subsequent conviction will be reversed only 
when the defendant can prove that there was an “actual conflict of 
interest” that “adversely affected his lawyer’s representation.”76  This 
“adverse effects” test, as it is known, is qualitatively different than the 
standard under the ethical rules of the profession, which assess only the 
risk of impairment and not the actual effect that a conflict has on the 
representation provided.77 
                                                     
 71. Id. at 484–89 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)) (noting Glasser was the 
Court’s earliest decision addressing the constitutional implications of conflicts of interest).  In 
Glasser, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant who was forced to 
receive representation by a lawyer with a conflict of interest.  Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484–85.  For a 
good discussion of Glasser and its implications for the Court’s conflicts jurisprudence, see Green, 
supra note 22, at 1204–06. 
 72. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). 
 73. Id. at 347 (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485). 
 74. Id.  See Burger v. Kemp,  483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987) (expressing similar views in a case 
where two law partners represented defendants who had been jointly indicted but separately tried for 
the same crime).  In identifying the applicable standard of proof, the Burger Court noted that it 
“generally presume[s]” that a defense lawyer “is fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete 
loyalty to his or her client.”  Id. 
 75. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346–48. 
 76. Id. at 350.  The Court left open the question, since resolved in Mickens, whether the adverse 
effects test applied in cases where, although there was no defense objection, the trial court knew or 
should have known about a conflict.  See infra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
695 (1984) (defining the standard for most cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel).  Under 
the Strickland test, a defendant who is seeking post-conviction relief must prove that defense 
counsel’s conduct was objectively unreasonable and that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, 
there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Id.  For 
a sampling of the criticism of the Strickland test, see Primus, supra note 3, at 684 n.24 (collecting 
critical commentary of the Strickland test); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?,  44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 67 n.98 (1991) 
(same).  For a particularly strong condemnation of the Strickland standard in death penalty cases, see 
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Most recently, in Mickens v. Taylor,78 the issue before the Court was 
whether a defendant must meet the Sullivan adverse effects test when 
there was no defense objection, but the trial court knew or should have 
known of a potential conflict of interest from another source.79  Based 
upon its assessment of precedent,80 the Court concluded that the 
Holloway automatic reversal standard is appropriate only when the trial 
court ignores a defense objection.  In all other cases, even when the trial 
court knows about a likely conflict, the defendant must prove that an 
actual conflict of interest had an adverse effect on the quality of 
representation provided.81  In coming to this conclusion, the Court again 
                                                                                                                       
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the 
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). 
 78. 535 U.S. 162 (2002). 
 79. Id. at 164.  It was undisputed that the judge who appointed the defense attorney in Mickens 
knew or should have known that there was a potential conflict of interest.  Id. at 165. 
 80. Much of the discussion in Mickens involved interpretation of a remand order in Wood v. 
Georgia, a case where a conflict of interest had been alleged during a probation-revocation hearing.  
450 U.S. 261, 262–63 (1981).  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Mickens, concluded that the 
order remanding the case in Wood supported the conclusion that the Sullivan adverse effects test 
applied in any case where defense counsel did not raise an objection that a conflict of interest was 
present. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 169–72.  The dissenting justices in Mickens disagreed, arguing that 
Wood supported the position that the Holloway automatic reversal standard should apply in any case 
where the trial court knew or should have known that a conflict was present.  Id. at 186–87 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); id. at 195–202 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 81. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174.  Justice Scalia suggested in dicta that a more rigorous standard of 
proof than the Sullivan adverse effects test might be appropriate in cases other than multiple 
representation.  Id. at 175–76.  Lower federal courts have disagreed on this issue: some have 
concluded, or at least assumed, that the Sullivan adverse effects test applies to all conflicts cases, 
even when multiple representation is not alleged.  See, e.g., United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 
36 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 513 (2008) (applying Sullivan adverse effects test where 
defense counsel’s law partner represented a defense witness); United States v. Stitt, 441 F.3d 297, 
303 (4th Cir. 2006) (“we have concluded on multiple occasions that the Sullivan presumption 
applies, even when counsel is not simultaneously representing two or more persons”), vacated on 
other grounds, 459 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fuller, 312 F.3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 
2002) (assuming that Sullivan adverse effects test applies to conflict caused by defense counsel’s 
alleged desire to shield himself from malpractice claim); Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 896–97 
(9th Cir. 2002) (applying Sullivan adverse effects test where defense counsel and defendant were 
simultaneously being prosecuted by the same prosecutor’s office); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 
307 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Sullivan adverse effects test to a conflict of interest caused by 
contingency fee agreement); Graffia v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(applying Sullivan adverse effects test to a case where defense counsel had an alleged conflict based 
on prior employment as a prosecutor).  Other courts have concluded that the question is still open.  
See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding, for the purposes 
of federal habeas corpus review, that the law is not settled as to whether the Sullivan adverse effects 
test applies to a purported conflict based on an attorney’s personal interests); Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 
F.3d 809, 817–18 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that, for purposes of federal habeas review, there is no 
clearly established law to extend the Sullivan adverse effects test to situations other than multiple 
representation).  Finally, some courts have concluded that the Sullivan adverse effects test applies 
only to cases of multiple representation.  See, e.g., Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1266 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(concluding that one cannot read Sullivan in a broader context than multiple client representation).  
For discussion of these various positions, see Shiner, supra note 4, at 980–96. 
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reiterated that defense attorneys are in the best position to determine 
conflicts, are ethically obligated to do so, and essentially make 
statements under oath.82 
As this review of Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates, the 
Court has spoken inconsistently on whether defense attorneys are well-
suited to address and resolve conflicts of interest that can arise in 
criminal cases.  While others have noted these competing views,83 no one 
has yet explored whether there is empirical support for the Court’s 
claims.  Section II tackles this open question by reviewing available 
empirical data about the corrosive effects of conflicts of interest on 
decision-making and judgment. 
C. Defense Lawyer Testimony 
A related question is whether a defense attorney who is accused of 
ineffectiveness due to a conflict of interest can be expected to testify 
accurately about decisions made during representation.  This question is 
important because attorneys accused of ineffectiveness often play a 
central role in claims for post-conviction relief.  While this point may 
seem obvious, some explanation is helpful. 
While the Supreme Court has not defined with precision the 
elements of the Sullivan adverse effects test, lower courts have 
interpreted it in slightly different ways.  Most require that the defendant 
prove that there was an alternative defense strategy not pursued by 
defense counsel that was either “inherently” in conflict with the strategy 
that counsel did pursue, or that defense counsel did not pursue an 
alternative strategy because of the conflict of interest.84  In other words, 
the defendant must prove causation—that the conflict caused defense 
counsel to forego an identifiable alternative strategy.  Other courts add an 
additional requirement—that the alternative strategy be “objectively 
                                                     
 82. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 167–68. 
 83. See Green, supra note 22, at 1226–27. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 76–77 (1st Cir. 2008) (defendant must 
show an alternative strategy was plausible and was in conflict with the attorney’s “other loyalties or 
interests”), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 513 (2008); United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 392–93 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (adverse effect on counsel’s performance when “counsel’s judgment was actually fettered 
by concern over the effect of certain trial decisions on other clients”); Hess v. Mazurkiewicz, 135 
F.3d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1998) (defendant must show an alternative strategy was plausible and was in 
conflict with the attorney’s “other loyalties or interests”); United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157 
(2d Cir. 1994) (same).  Slight variations on this test have been developed.  See, e.g., Sanders v. 
Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that if the defendant’s attorney had a conflict of 
interest, the defendant must show that “some effect on counsel’s handling of particular aspects of the 
[case] was ‘likely’” (citing United States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
ELDRED FINAL 10/29/2009  4:57:18 PM 
2009] THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 61 
reasonable” under the facts and circumstances known to the attorney at 
the time that tactical decisions in the defendant’s case were made.85 
Whichever test is employed, proof from outside the record will be 
necessary in most cases.86  As the Supreme Court noted in Holloway, a 
conflict of interest is pernicious most often because of what it causes a 
lawyer to refrain from doing, rather than what it causes a lawyer to do.87  
For example, in a case of multiple representation, a conflict may prevent 
defense counsel 
from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an 
agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a 
favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable.  Generally 
speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the 
admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to 
another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative 
involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the 
culpability of one by emphasizing that of another.  Examples can be 
readily multiplied.88 
Such omissions, “by their very nature, do not appear on the record and 
thus, require further fact-finding, extra-record investigation and where 
necessary, an evidentiary hearing.”89 
Ironically, the person likely to know the most about what transpired 
during representation of the defendant—and in particular about the 
reasons why certain decisions were made—is the lawyer whose conduct 
is alleged to have been ineffective.  This creates an interesting dynamic,  
 
                                                     
 85. E.g., United States v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 241, 251–52 (4th Cir. 2007); Covey v. United 
States, 377 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2004); Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 
2004); see also United States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990) (defendant must prove 
there was a “specific and seemingly valid or genuine alternative strategy or tactic inherently in 
conflict with his duties to others or to his own personal interests.”). 
 86. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503–05 (2003) (collateral review is better 
suited to resolve claims of ineffectiveness, such as alleged conflicting interests); Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 378 (1986) (collateral review is frequently the only avenue through which a 
defendant can bring a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Primus, supra 
note 3, at 688–90 (explaining most jurisdictions require a defendant to raise ineffectiveness claims 
through collateral proceedings rather than direct appeal); Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of 
Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 
BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 796–97 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he heart of [Massaro v. United States] is that 
ineffective assistance claims typically cannot be litigated effectively on direct appeal.”). 
 87. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 736 (Pa. 2002); see also Primus, supra note 3, at 
689. 
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where the defense lawyer whose conduct is under scrutiny will often be 
the most important witness at the collateral proceeding. 90 
Mickens is again illustrative.  While most of the discussion in the 
Supreme Court was about interpretation of precedent,91 Justice Kennedy, 
whose concurring opinion provided the two crucial votes to affirm the 
conviction, focused on the testimony of the defense attorney, Bryan 
Saunders.  Applying the required deferential standard of review, Justice 
Kennedy was not persuaded to disturb the district court’s credibility 
findings that “Saunders did not believe he had any obligation to his 
former client,” or that Saunders’s “prior representation did not influence 
the choices he made during the course of the trial.”92  On the issue of 
consent, Justice Kennedy concluded, as did the district court, that the 
defense was foreclosed by the defendant’s insistence on his own 
innocence.93 
In contrast, in Sullivan, the testimony of defense counsel was 
sufficient to meet the adverse effects test.  The defendant there sought 
habeas relief claiming that his attorneys had a conflict of interest caused 
by multiple representation.94  During an evidentiary hearing on the issue, 
one of the attorneys accused of ineffectiveness admitted that the defense 
team did not present evidence beneficial to the defendant because of 
                                                     
 90. Others have noted the importance of the testimony of defense counsel in post-conviction 
proceedings to determine ineffective assistance of counsel.  See David M. Siegel, My Reputation or 
Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical Obligations of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction 
Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 88 (1999) (noting that a lawyer who testifies about his or her 
own ineffectiveness “is not simply a witness.  The lawyer is often the most significant and 
potentially valuable witness the former client may have to demonstrate ineffective assistance, and 
the lawyer’s cooperation may dramatically assist the former client’s claim.”) (footnote omitted); 
Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 (1995) (noting that only the defendant and defense counsel are competent 
to discuss the strategic decisions made during representation, and that an allegation of 
ineffectiveness will be “unlikely to succeed” when the attorney whose conduct is under review 
“vigorously contests” the claim). 
 91. See supra text of note 80. 
 92. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 177 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that the 
district court’s findings would be upheld unless “clearly erroneous”). 
 93. Id. at 179.  Justice Kennedy also questioned the evidentiary basis for a defense of consent. 
Id.  Like the district court, Justice Kennedy did not address whether a non-conflicted attorney who 
had thoroughly investigated a consent defense could have convinced Mickens to change the defense 
strategy, or, through investigation, could have found evidence to buttress the consent defense.  See 
supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 94. The three co-defendants accused of murder had been represented by the same two 
attorneys, although each defendant was tried separately.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 337–38 
(1980).  The defendant was tried first and convicted, whereas the two other co-defendants were later 
acquitted. Id. at 338.  Although the defendants were tried separately, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the case involved multiple representation of defendants for conflicts purposes.  Id. at 342. 
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loyalties owed to another co-defendant.95  Based on this testimony, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, on remand from the Supreme 
Court, that “it is clear that the attorneys failed to put forth their best case 
for [the defendant].  There is no question that their performance was less 
than it would have been had they not been representing [the co-
defendant] as well.”96  As a result, habeas corpus was granted.97 
These and other cases98 demonstrate that defense attorney testimony 
is often essential to resolving allegations of ineffectiveness.  Yet, the 
question remains whether an attorney accused of ineffective assistance of 
counsel can be expected to testify accurately in post-conviction 
proceedings. 99  The answer to this question lies in the empirical 
evidence, as discussed in the next section. 
                                                     
 95. The defendant’s lawyer in post-conviction proceedings admitted that the decision not to call 
the co-defendant, which could have undermined a key prosecution witness against the defendant, 
was motivated by the desire to protect the witness from self-incrimination.  See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
723 F.2d 1077, 1087 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 96. Id.  Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (providing another example where the testimony 
of the defense attorney was critical to the determination of whether a conflict of interest rendered 
assistance of counsel ineffective).  In Burger, the defendant, who was sentenced to death, sought 
post-conviction relief, claiming that his trial attorney had a conflict of interest because the co-
defendant in the case, who had been tried separately, had been represented by the defense attorney’s 
law partner.  Id. at 781.  There was no dispute that the two attorneys discussed strategies and 
research in preparing their defenses and that defense counsel authored appellate briefs for both the 
defendant and co-defendant.  Id.  In post-conviction proceedings, the attorney with the alleged 
conflict testified about the strategic reasons for decisions made on behalf of the defendant, including 
that he did not tailor his defense in any way to protect the co-defendant.  Based in large measure on 
this testimony, the Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict of interest that resulted in an 
adverse effect on the representation provided.  Id. at 780–88. 
 97. Cuyler, 723 F.2d at 1087. 
 98. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding, 
based on testimony of defense counsel, that defendant met burden of proof to establish an actual 
conflict of interest); Hammon v. Miller, No. CIV-04-1007-HE, 2008 WL 2740994, at *1 (W.D. 
Okla. July 10, 2008) (based on testimony of both trial counsel and appellate counsel, the district 
court concluded that defendant failed to establish actual conflict of interest).  Of course, defense 
attorney testimony can also be critical when other types of deficiencies in representation are alleged.  
See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192 (2004) (concluding, based on testimony of defense 
counsel, that the decision to concede guilt in death penalty case was objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances); Weeks v. Snyder, 219 F.3d 245, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2000) (crediting testimony of 
defense counsel as a reason to deny ineffectiveness claim where defendant claimed that his attorney 
had failed to advise him about the importance of certain evidence). 
 99. Some courts have concluded that defense attorneys should not be relied upon when a 
conflict of interest is alleged.  See sources cited supra note 21; see also Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 
1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The existence of an actual conflict cannot be governed solely by the 
perceptions of the attorney; rather, the court itself must examine the record to discern whether the 
attorney’s behavior seems to have been influenced by the suggested conflict.”). 
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III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
The assumption that lawyers in criminal cases can, through rational 
deliberation, identify and resolve conflicts of interest, and testify 
accurately about them, needs to be reassessed.  For decades, experts in 
decision-making theory have explored the psychological processes that 
limit rational behavior.100  The insights from this field of study, known 
generally as behavioral economics,101 have caused many commentators 
to reevaluate legal doctrine in a variety of contexts.102  More recently, 
this research has been applied to the process by which ethical judgments 
are made, including assessments professionals make in the exercise of 
their ethical responsibilities.103  Conflicts of interests have received 
particular scrutiny, in large measure because of the role that conflicts 
played in major corporate scandals such as the collapse of Enron and 
                                                     
 100. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (2007) 
(noting developments over the last five decades).  For a sampling of some of the major works in this 
area, including discussions on the ongoing debate about the validity of this form of interdisciplinary 
work, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 
51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to 
Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000); Symposium, Empirical 
Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1075 (2003). 
 101. Other descriptive terms include “‘behavioralism, behavioral law and economics,’ . . . ‘the 
new law and psychology,’ ‘legal decision theory,’ or ‘law and behavioral science.’”  Jeremy A. 
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems Of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 159 
(2005). 
 102. For a sampling of the application of behavioral economics to legal study, see Tom Baker et 
al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) 
(criminal law); Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 
749 (2008) (contract law); John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil 
Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008) (civil litigation and settlement theory); Dennis D. 
Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 141 (2008) (intellectual property); Alon Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and 
Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected Role of Uncertainty in Deterring 
Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276 (1999) (criminal law); Jolls et al., supra note 100 (tort law); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118–
19 (1996) (civil litigation and settlement theory); Colleen M. Seifert, Now Why Didn’t I Think of 
That? The Cognitive Processes that Create the Obvious, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 489 (2008) 
(intellectual property); Ian Weinstein, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: Cognitive Bias in Legal 
Decision Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 783 (2003) (reflective lawyering).  For criticism of the 
movement to reassess legal doctrine based on the insights from behavioral economics, see Gregory 
Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law 
and Economics, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002). 
 103. See infra notes 110–28 and accompanying text.  Cass Sunstein has also discussed the 
existence and role of what he calls “moral heuristics,” although he notes the difficulty in their 
identification and application.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004). 
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WorldCom.104  This section reviews research on the psychology of 
conflicts of interest and discusses its application to criminal cases. 
A. Psychological Research and Conflicts of Interest 
Researchers have identified limits on the cognitive abilities of people 
to make rational judgments.  The notion, now well-documented, is that 
human decisions are limited by a host of heuristics, or mental short cuts, 
that are essential when humans process information.105  These shortcuts, 
while necessary for the speedy mental processing of information, also 
lead to predictable biases and errors in judgment.  Many of the 
systematic errors that have been identified are relevant to legal decision-
making.  For example, due to what has been called “extremeness 
aversion,” people are adverse to extremes and tend to seek compromise, 
which explains why the framing of choice is so important to predicting 
the result that will be achieved in any situation.106  Another well-
documented heuristic, “hindsight bias,” leads people to overstate the 
predictability of past events.107  This body of research documenting the 
limits on rationality emanates from the study of what has been labeled 
“bounded rationality,” the central idea of which is that humans are less 
rational in making decisions than classic economic theory suggests.108 
                                                     
 104. See Don A. Moore et al., Introduction, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 1, 1 (Don Moore et al. 
eds., 2005).  Conflicts of interest have been identified as one of the principal causes of accounting 
and auditing failures that led the collapse of companies such as Enron and Worldcom.  See, e.g., Joel 
Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 449, 472–77 (2002).  The recent economic problems precipitated by the subprime lending 
crisis have also been associated with conflicts of interest, especially conflicts that existed by the 
rating agencies responsible for assessing the risk of mortgage-backed securities.  See Eric Lipton & 
Raymond Hernandez, A Champion of Wall Street Reaps Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at A1. 
 105. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 3; see also HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).  For the 
seminal work documenting and discussing heuristics and biases, see JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 106. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 3; see, e.g., J.J. Prescott & 
Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 301, 329–30 (2006) (discussing the implications of extremeness aversion on sentencing options 
in criminal cases); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181–82 
(1997) (discussing the legal implications of extremeness aversion). 
 107. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 4; see, e.g., Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & 
ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 95–115 (discussing various legal implications of hindsight bias).  
For a discussion of the role of hindsight bias in cases where ineffective assistance of counsel is 
alleged, see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight Bias and After-The-Fact Review of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 108. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 14–16 (discussing bounded 
rationality and its related concepts, bounded willpower and bounded self-interest); see also Chugh et 
al., supra note 26, at 76–77 (discussing bounded rationality and related concepts); Milton Regan, 
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Applying insights from this and related areas of study, researchers 
are now focusing on biases that occur in ethical judgments, including 
conflicts of interest.  For example, researchers from Harvard University 
have identified a model of behavior termed “bounded ethicality,” which 
concludes that, similar to the bounded nature of rationality, people are 
limited during the process of making ethical decisions, such as those 
involving conflicts of interest.109  Relying on psychological research by 
numerous experts, this model concludes that humans are motivated 
toward “perceptions, judgments, and behaviors that are biased toward the 
goal of maintaining self-worth, not just toward the more neutral goals of 
speed and efficiency” in decision-making.110  The key to understanding 
this model of behavior is that forces favoring self-worth operate at an 
unconscious level—that is, beyond the scope of rational perception and 
judgment—as do other documented heuristics. 
Three specific biases relating to the motivation to maintain a positive 
view of the self have been identified as the core of bounded ethicality.111  
All are unconscious in that they occur below the decision-maker’s level 
of awareness.  The first, called the “self as moral” bias, describes the 
tendency to believe oneself as more “honest, trustworthy, ethical, and 
fair than others.”112  This bias is also described as the “illusion of 
objectivity”—people consistently consider themselves more objective 
than their average peer.113  This overconfidence means that humans tend 
                                                                                                                       
Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (2007) (discussing and citing 
related research). 
 109. Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 74–103.  Max Bazerman of Harvard Business School, who 
has been responsible for much of the research on bounded ethicality, provides a comprehensive 
literature review in this area at http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbazerman/bounded_ethicality.htm.  For 
an excellent discussion of bounded ethicality and related research as applied to corporate directors, 
see Anthony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
237. 
 110. Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 78.  Research applying bounded ethicality to particular 
circumstances has found, for example, that implicit stereotyping is not the product of rationality, but 
rather the result of automatic processes that occur below conscious awareness.  Id. at 79 (citing 
Mahzarin R. Banaji & R. Bhaskar, Implicit Stereotypes and Memory: The Bounded Rationality of 
Social Beliefs, in MEMORY, BRAIN & BELIEF 139–75 (Daniel L. Schacter & Elaine Scarry eds., 
2000)).  Research in this area includes the creation of Project Implicit, a collaborative virtual 
enterprise between numerous research universities into “implicit social cognition.”  Project Implicit, 
http://www.projectimplicit.net/about.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2009).  As described on the project’s 
website, implicit social cognition includes the “cognitions, feelings, and evaluations that are not 
necessarily available to conscious awareness, conscious control, conscious intention, or self-
reflection.”  Id. 
 111. See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 81. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing research from five studies in which eighty-five percent of participants rated their 
own objectivity higher than that of their peers).  Examples of the illusion of objectivity abound.  For 
example, in one study people were assigned responsibility for deciding the wages for work 
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to justify questionable ethical behavior as a self-defense to maintain their 
illusions.114  The second, called the “self as competent” bias, describes 
the false perception people have of themselves as being better than others 
in possessing a series of desirable attributes.115  These include traits such 
as “cooperativeness, decision making, negotiating, rationality . . . and 
intelligence.”116  The third bias, “self as deserving,” means that people 
allocate more responsibility to themselves for contributions to an 
outcome than they actually deserve.117  Each of these biases is “stubborn” 
in that the decision-maker, not aware of its existence, will tend to believe 
that he or she acted ethically, even in the face of evidence to the 
contrary.118  Further, evidence of unethical behavior is constantly 
rearranged by one’s sub-conscious to preserve one’s self-perceptions as 
moral, competent and deserving.119 
These three biases have a significant impact on decision-making in 
situations where conflicts of interest are present.  For example, people’s 
overconfidence in their objectivity tends to make them believe that they 
                                                                                                                       
performed.  David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, & Fairness Biases, in EQUITY 
THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 63–64 (David M. Messick & 
Karen S. Cook eds., 1983).  Believing they were making a fair allocation, study participants 
determined that they deserved, on average, $35.24 for ten hours of work, but concluded that their 
partner deserved only $30.29 for the same work.  Id. at 70.  Similarly, participants in a study to 
determine the effects of self-serving biases in a legal dispute were randomly assigned to the role of 
either plaintiff or defendant in a hypothetical case.  George Lowenstein et al., Self-Serving 
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 139 (1993).  The 
participants differed in their perceptions of a fair settlement by nearly $18,000 in the direction that 
served the side to which they were assigned.  Id. at 150.  For a discussion of these and other studies, 
see Nicholas Epley & Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171–87 (2004). 
 114. Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 82–83. 
 115. Id. at 84. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 85–86.  One area extensively studied is the degree to which people believe that they 
have control over chance events.  For an excellent discussion, see Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathan D. 
Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 196 (1988) (“In a series of studies adopting gambling formats, [researchers] 
found that people often act as if they have control in situations that are actually determined by 
chance. When manipulations suggestive of skill, such as competition, choice, familiarity, and 
involvement, are introduced into chance situations, people behave as if the situations were 
determined by skill and, thus, were ones over which they could exert some control. For example, 
people infer that they have greater control if they personally throw dice than if someone else throws 
it for them.  Similarly, a large literature on covariation estimation indicates that people substantially 
overestimate their degree of control over heavily chance-determined events.  When people expect to 
produce a certain outcome and the outcome then occurs, they often overestimate the degree to which 
they were instrumental in bringing it about.”) (citations omitted). 
 118. Chugh et. al., supra note 25, at 80. 
 119. Id.  This tendency has been described as the “totalitarian ego,” where the ego “tampers and 
rearranges self-knowledge so as to ensure that a certain view is maintained, but retains no conscious 
belief that such tampering has taken place.”  Id. (citing A.G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: 
Fabrication and Revision of Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980)).  See also Epley & 
Caruso, supra note 113. 
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will not be influenced by divergent interests at stake.120  In addition, 
when one engages in questionable ethical behavior, one’s automatic 
process of self-defense, born out of the motivation to see one’s self as 
moral, justifies the behavior as being consistent with ethical norms.121  
The biases of the self as competent and deserving help justify 
questionable conduct, allowing one to believe that decisions that enhance 
self-interest comport with ethical norms.122 
The role of self-interest is essential to understanding the limits of 
rational deliberation when conflicts of interest are present.  Researchers 
from Carnegie Mellon University have focused on the “automaticity” of 
thought in explaining this behavior.123  According to the research, 
conflicts of interest are an example of the “dual process model” of 
decision-making, in which the human mind processes self-interest 
“automatically,” while decisions about professional responsibility are 
processed by the “controlled” mode of analytical thought.124  While 
automatic processing occurs outside of conscious awareness, and thus 
cannot be voluntarily curtailed, controlled processing is the product of 
deliberation, which is subject to volition and control.125 
In most instances, automatic and controlled processes work together 
to make decisions.  But when a conflict of interest is present, and self-
interest and professional responsibility collide, the decision often results 
                                                     
 120. Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 82–83.  For example, in 2000, the CEO of Arthur Anderson 
testified before the Securities and Exchange Commission that then-existing standards of 
professionalism and objectivity in the accounting industry were sufficient to ensure auditor 
independence, notwithstanding the possibility of conflicts of interest.  Id.  We now know that these 
standards were far from sufficient to prevent the accounting scandals that led to the collapse of firms 
such as Arthur Anderson.  For a discussion of how unconscious biases produced conflicts of interests 
that were at the root of these accounting scandals, see Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and 
the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling, 31 ACAD. MGMT 
REV. 10 (2006) [hereinafter Moral Seduction]. 
 121. See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 83. 
 122. Id. at 84–86.  The bounded nature of ethical decision-making is particularly prevalent when 
self-evaluation is difficult to disprove.  Id. at 82.  According to the research, when no objective 
measure of ethicality is present, the ability to aggrandize the self at the expense of others is 
enhanced.  Id.  In the face of ambiguity, the illusion of objectivity undermines the ability to identify 
conflicts of interest that are present.  Id.  For discussion of the ambiguity in the ethical rules 
governing conflicts of interest in law, see infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 123. Moore & Lowenstein, supra note 25, at 189–202. 
 124. Id. at 190–92. 
 125. Id.  A classic example of automatic processing is vision, an activity that involves 
“numerous parallel processes—e.g., edge and pattern recognition and retrieval of information from 
memory.”  Id. at 191.  Some characteristics of vision, which are typically true of all automatic 
processes, are that it is largely unaccompanied by any feeling of subjective effort and is involuntary.  
Id.  In addition, the “cognitive processes that give rise to vision are almost totally inscrutable,” 
meaning that most people would be unable to explain the brain activity that correlates to why 
humans see whatever is in their field of vision.  Id. 
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in an automatic preference for self-interest.126  This results in a critical 
observation: while the decision-maker will believe that the decision 
comes from rational deliberation where all competing concerns are 
considered and weighed, in actuality the automatic bias toward self-
interest will often create an error in judgment that favors self-interest, 
“automatically and without conscious awareness.”127  In other words, the 
decision-maker will rationalize behavior as consistent with ethical 
norms, even when in actuality the decision preferences self-interest. 
This process of ethical rationalization has been identified and 
discussed by other researchers.  For example, Jonathan Haidt, a Professor 
of Psychology at the University of Virginia, has proposed a “social 
intuitionist model” to explain the specific processes by which ethical 
rationalization occurs.128  According to Haidt, whose work relies on an 
exhaustive survey of existing social science literature, most moral 
judgments are not the product of rational deliberation, as often 
believed.129 Rather, the precipitating cause is “moral intuition,” which is 
defined as “the sudden appearance in consciousness of moral judgment” 
that occurs “without any conscious awareness of having gone through 
steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.”130 As 
with other automatic processes, intuition appears effortlessly and 
                                                     
 126. Id. at 194–96. 
 127. Id. at 199.  The power of automatic processes is explained by a number of factors, including 
the speed with which automatic processes operate, the powerful influence that affect has on how 
information is retrieved from memory, and the additional cognitive scrutiny that information 
inconsistent with automatic processes tends to receive.  Id. at 193. 
 128. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) [hereinafter The Emotional Dog].  For other 
descriptions of the social intuitionist model, including responses to critics, see Jonathan Haidt, The 
Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 283 (2004); Jonathan Haidt & 
Craig Joseph, Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable 
Virtues, 133 DAEDALUS 55 (2004).  Haidt’s work is cited by both the Harvard and Carnegie Mellon 
research teams.  See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 83; Moore & Lowenstein, supra note 25, at 194. 
 129. See The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 816–17 (questioning the causality of moral 
reasoning).  According to Haidt, the primary proponent of the rationalist approach to moral 
judgments was Lawrence Kohlberg, who argued in favor of a six-level progression of human 
development.  Id. at 816.  Kohlberg’s research has been the basis for discussions about 
professionalism and legal ethics.  See, e.g., Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development 
Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995) (discussing Kohlberg’s theory of 
moral development in teaching Professional Responsibility). 
 130. The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 818.  In setting forth his model, Haidt relies on 
research demonstrating that most judgments, including moral judgments, are made through the types 
of automatic, as opposed to controlled, processes of thought just described.  Id. at 819–20; supra 
notes 123–27 and accompanying text.  Others have also described the importance of intuition in 
legal decision-making.  See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John R. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: 
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (discussing 
intuition in the context of criminal policy). 
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unconsciously.131  In contrast, “moral reasoning”—which is the 
intentional, conscious and effortful process of making an ethical 
judgment, such as the conscious effort to consider ethical norms—is the 
“slow, ex post facto process” that tends to explain, or rationalize, the 
decision already made.132  In other words, the decision-maker uses 
rational thought to “search for arguments that support an already-made 
judgment” through moral intuition.133  Using an analogy, Haidt explains 
that the dog of moral intuition wags the tail of moral reasoning.134 
Applying Haidt’s work to conflicts of interest helps to explain the 
decision-making process at work.  Most decision-makers believe that the 
decisions they reach are the result of careful evaluation of existing 
norms, when in fact such post hoc reasoning functions merely to explain 
decisions previously reached through moral intuition.135  Further, post 
hoc explanations are motivated by the same biases that favor self-interest 
in judgment, as previously described.136  The net result is that, when 
explaining a moral judgment, people act like “intuitive lawyers”—
unconsciously focusing on evidence that supports a preordained 
conclusion and discounting evidence that does not fit.  Of course, this is 
not to say that conscious moral reasoning can never override an initial 
moral intuition, taking precedence in the causal chain of events.  But, 
according to Haidt, such situations are rare, occurring only when moral 
                                                     
 131. See The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 818.  Haidt describes four links in his social 
intuitionist model: (1) The intuitive judgment link, which involves the effortless and automatic 
awareness in consciousness of a moral judgment; (2) the post hoc reasoning link, which involves the 
effortful process whereby the decision-maker “searches for arguments that will support an already-
made judgment”; (3) the reasoned persuasion link, which involves the verbalization of the moral 
judgment, which can influence the moral intuitions of others; and (4) the social persuasion link, 
which describes the dominant influence of group norms on moral reasoning.  Id. at 818–19.  
According to the model, moral reasoning has a role in ethical decision-making, which occurs by way 
of two additional links: (1) the reasoned judgment link, which describes the rare situations in which 
people can override an initial moral intuition by the “sheer force of logic,” and (2) the private 
reflection link, which describes how a person can spontaneously activate an intuition that opposes 
initial moral intuitions.  Id. at 819.  Role-taking, where a person views a situation from the 
perspective other than one’s own, can result in activating the private reflection link.  Id.  For a 
description and application of Haidt’s model, see Regan, supra note 108 (applying the social 
intuitionist model in assessing moral decision-making in organizational settings). 
 132. The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 814.  In coming to this conclusion, Haidt relies on 
research studies on “post hoc constructions,” which describes situations where people who are asked 
to explain their behavior believe that they are engaging in introspection to discover its cause, but in 
fact are searching for “plausible theories about why they might have done what they did.” Id. at 822–
23 (citing Richard E. Nisbitt & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Know: Verbal 
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 248 (1977)). 
 133. The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 818. 
 134. Id. at 825. 
 135. The processes by which intuitions are formed are complex, and depend in large measure on 
a culture’s collective sense of right and wrong, good and bad.  Id. at 827–28. 
 136. See supra notes 110–28 and accompanying text. 
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intuition is weak and the capacity of the decision-maker to engage in 
reasoned judgment is strong.137 
A slightly different explanation of ethical rationalization focuses on 
what has been described as the “temporal trichotomy of prediction, 
action and recollection” of ethical judgments.138  Studies demonstrate 
that people tend to overestimate their ability to act ethically, both 
prospectively when asked to consider how ethical they will be in the 
future and in hindsight when asked to evaluate how ethical they have 
been in the past.139  The cause of these erroneous judgments is the 
motivations present at different moments in time.  When looking 
prospectively, people tend to focus on what “should” happen.140  In 
contrast, during the phase when action itself takes place, what people 
“want” tends to dominate.141  Looking backward, people tend to 
erroneously identify conduct that should have dominated the decision-
making process, when in fact it was people’s wants that dominated 
behavior.142 
In sum, research demonstrates that, just as cognitive heuristics and 
biases systematically cause deviations from full rationality, so too a set 
of motivations causes systematic deviations from full ethicality and 
professional responsibility when conflicts of interest are present.  
Professionals often believe falsely that they will not be corrupted by 
conflicts of interest, yet in reality they are subject to the same 
unconscious biases toward self-interest and self-worth as everyone 
                                                     
 137. The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 819.  See also Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, 
Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions About Morality, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY 181 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
 138. Ann Tenbrunsel et al., Why We Aren’t as Ethical as We Think We Are: A Temporal 
Explanation 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08-012, 2007), available at http://hbswk 
.hbs.edu/item/5763.html. 
 139. Id. at 13–16, 24–30. 
 140. Id. at 4. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 24–30.  The research reveals a series of factors that make the “want-self” dominant 
during the “action phase,” that is, at the moment when the decision with ethical implications is 
made.  Id. at 25–26.  First, people’s forecasts of future ethicality tend to be abstract and do not 
include the many factors that will be present when a decision is actually made.  Id. at 16–17.  For 
example, in predicting one’s future willingness to make a charitable contribution, one fails to 
perceive many of the factors—such as constraints, distractions, and more immediate needs—that 
may be present at the moment of decision.  Id. at 17–18.  Second, research demonstrates that various 
factors can diminish the degree to which people become aware of a particular decision’s ethical 
dimension.  Id.  The result, described as “moral fading,” has been demonstrated to occur, for 
example, when a weak sanction is in place, when the decision-maker is overly focused on meeting a 
standard rather than satisfying an ethical goal, or when linguistic disguises cover up unethical 
aspects of a decision.  Id. at 20–22.  Third, visceral factors present at the moment of decision (such 
as mood, pain, and hunger) can crowd out other goals, such as a focus on the wants and needs of 
others.  Id. at 23–24. 
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else.143  The results are errors in judgment, both in predicting whether 
conflicting interests will have an influence on decisions and when 
reflecting upon whether a conflict influenced decisions previously made.  
Like all cognitive biases, these errors occur below the level of 
consciousness, invisibly infecting the decision-making process but 
leaving no trail. 
B. Psychological Biases in Criminal Cases 
A number of issues arise about the applicability of the psychology of 
conflicts of interest in criminal cases.  The first is whether social science 
research applies to lawyers in general, whose conduct is constrained by 
rules of professional responsibility.  In other words, can the self-
regulation of lawyers act as a check on self-interest when conflicts are 
present? 
The answer, unfortunately, is that the rules alone do not provide 
sufficient safeguards.  As already discussed, the rules governing conflicts 
of interest provide lawyers with substantial latitude to decide whether 
representation is permitted.144  Indeed, except for a few situations, 
lawyers must decide both the risk of divided loyalties and whether 
waiver is both permitted and appropriate.145  Research demonstrates that 
situations where discretion is permitted, and bright lines do not exist, are 
where psychological biases that skew judgment are most likely to 
operate.146  Given these circumstances, there is little reason to believe 
that the governing rules will be able to check the unconscious pull of 
self-interest. 
Leonard Gross, who has evaluated the conflicts provisions of the 
Model Rules, has come to the same conclusion.  Looking at the issue 
through the prism of behavioral economics, his work relies on research 
                                                     
 143. See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 90–91; see also Gross, supra note 23, at 113 (noting that 
“social science literature suggests that a lawyer will rationalize his behavior as being ethical because 
of the innate human tendency to rationalize one’s self-interest as being consistent with morality”) 
(citing Susan Daicoff, (Oxymoron?) Ethical Decisionmaking by Attorneys: An Empirical Study, 48 
FLA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1996))). 
 144. See supra notes 41–55 and accompanying text; see also Zacharias, supra note 38, at 436 
(discussing the ambiguity of the Model Rules that cover conflicts of interest). 
 145. Only a few of the rules governing conflicts of interest create bright line rules prohibiting 
certain types of conduct.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d) (2008) 
(prohibiting agreements giving lawyers literary or media rights during representation); Id. R. 1.8(e) 
(prohibiting provision of financial assistance to clients during litigation); Id. R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting 
sexual relations between lawyers and clients during representation). 
 146. See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 82; Gross, supra note 23, at 115–16. 
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into heuristics and related fields,147 similar to the body of research that 
the Harvard and Carnegie Mellon teams rely upon in analyzing the 
psychology of conflicts.  After reviewing available research and 
conducting his own study,148 Gross has concluded that the rules of 
professional responsibility do not check unconscious biases that cause 
lawyers to act out of self-interest when conflicts of interest are present.149 
Research on other professions is consistent with this conclusion.  For 
example, a series of studies on accountants reveals that psychological 
biases produce conflicts of interest, notwithstanding rules that are 
supposed to check self-interest.150  Similarly, doctors have been found to 
suffer from psychological biases that make it difficult to check conflicts 
of interest caused by gifts and other incentives from outside groups, such 
as the pharmaceutical industry.151  Similar findings have been made 
about researchers in various areas of public policy.152 
                                                     
 147. See Gross, supra note 23, at 115–25.  Gross surveys many of the cognitive heuristics that 
can come into play when a lawyer makes a decision about conflicts of interest.  Id.  They include the 
“availability” heuristic (the bias in favor of circumstances that most readily come to mind); the 
“optimism” bias (the tendency to be overly optimistic that bad things will not happen); “ambiguity 
aversion” (the tendency to prefer known to unknown risks); “prospect theory” (the tendency to be 
more risk adverse when locking in a gain, and risk-seeking when choosing between losses); and the 
“endowment effect” (the tendency to place greater value on what is owned than on what is not).  See 
id. at 116–20.  For discussion of these and many other heuristics that have been identified through 
research, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 105. 
 148. Gross, supra note 23, at 127.  The study sent surveys to 439 graduates of Southern Illinois 
University School of Law, 157 of whom responded.  Id.  The data indicated that few lawyers discuss 
conflicts of interest with their clients on a frequent basis.  Id. at 128.  However, when lawyers do 
identify conflicts, they “overwhelmingly indicate that they believe that the conflicts are waivable.”  
Id.  The study concluded that, while it is possible that lawyers rarely have conflicts of interest, the 
“more plausible explanation” is that lawyers “do not reveal many conflicts to their clients” because 
of “self-interest.”  Id. at 130. 
 149. Id. at 125–33. 
 150. See, e.g., Moral Seduction, supra note 120, at 10 (stating that “[a]ccounting firms have 
incentives to avoid providing negative audit opinions to the managers who hire them and pay their 
auditing fees”); Max H. Bazerman et al., Reports of Solving the Conflicts of Interest in Auditing Are 
Highly Exaggerated, 31 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 43 (2006) (stating that accountants’ “motivation to 
please their clients represented a conflict of interest threatening both their reputations and their 
objectivity”); see also Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 88–89 (citing studies demonstrating that 
professional auditors are “vulnerable to the same motivated biases as are other people”). 
 151. See, e.g., Jerome P. Kassirer, Physicians’ Financial Ties with the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 25, at 133–41 (discussing the close relationships between 
doctors and the pharmaceutical industry); Andrew Stark, Why Are (Some) Conflicts of Interest in 
Medicine So Uniquely Vexing?, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 25, at 152–80 (discussing 
pharmaceutical company gifts of equipment and travel to physicians that blur internal and external 
interest for the physicians); Jason Dana & George Lowenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts 
to Physicians from Industry, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252–55 (2003) (stating “physicians typically 
report that they are not biased by financial arrangements with pharmaceutical companies, although a 
large body of research suggests that they are”). 
 152. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Conflicts of Interest in Public Policy Research, in CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST, supra note 25, at 233–62 (discussing the varieties of conflicts of interest public policy 
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A second issue that arises is whether, even if psychological research 
applies to lawyers in general, does it apply to the types of conflicts that 
arise in criminal cases?  As previously noted, many conflicts in criminal 
cases seem, at least on the surface, to be between duties that lawyers owe 
to others, rather than between the self-interest of the lawyer and duties of 
professional responsibility.153  Under these circumstances, does research 
that focuses on self-interest apply? 
To be sure, some situations present a direct conflict between a 
lawyer’s self-interest and duties to others, such as those identified in 
Model Rule 1.8.154  But many other cases seem, at least at first glance, to 
involve situations where self-interest is not as apparent.  For example, 
multiple representation would seem to raise conflicts only between the 
obligations to two or more clients, not between the interests of the lawyer 
and clients.  Similarly, successive representation seems to raise conflicts 
only between a current and former client, not between the lawyer and 
clients.  In these situations, where the lawyer is balancing competing 
obligations to others, are the unconscious biases that produce errors in 
judgment present? 
A closer look at conflicts in criminal cases reveals that lawyer self-
interest lurks below the surface in many situations.  For example, when a 
privately retained lawyer is required by the ethical rules to withdraw 
from, or to forgo, representation because of a conflict, there is a direct 
economic impact in the loss of a paying client.  As a result, the decision 
on whether a conflict exists or is waivable is connected directly to the 
lawyer’s self-interest.155  These same interests exist for lawyers paid 
from public funds on a per case basis to represent indigent defendants—
the loss of one client due to a conflict will have an economic impact on 
the lawyer’s earnings.156 
                                                                                                                       
researchers face). 
 153. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. 
 154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2008) (listing personal conflicts regulated by 
this rule). 
 155. See sources cited supra note 65 (discussing the economic interests at stake). 
 156. Indigent defense services in the United States are funded in three principal ways: (1) the 
public defender model, whereby through either a  public agency or private organization attorneys are 
paid as salaried employees; (2) the assigned counsel model, where private attorneys receive court 
appointments and are paid either on an hourly basis or a flat fee per case; and (3) the contract model, 
whereby an organization of attorneys agrees to handle a set number of cases, paid either per case or 
on a flat fee.  THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED 
COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW 1–2 (2003) 
www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/compensationratesnoncapital2003.
pdf.  Criticism levied against the inadequacy of funding for indigent defense services has been 
plentiful.  E.g., STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7–37 
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But what of the many public defenders who are not paid per case?157  
For them, self-interest also exists below the surface, but can cut in 
different ways depending upon the situation.  Some cases might be 
sufficiently glamorous that a public defender would want to stay on the 
matter because of the media exposure it promises: the publicity might 
benefit the lawyer’s future earning prospects or reputation.  
Alternatively, a lawyer who has invested substantial effort on behalf of a 
defendant may have an interest in seeing the case to its conclusion, even 
when there is no economic incentive in doing so. 
In contrast, when a case has no media value, and no other interests 
favor keeping the case, the incentives might pull in the opposite 
direction.  Public defenders maintain notoriously excessive caseloads 
that make the provision of quality representation difficult.158  The 
corresponding incentive, therefore, is to reduce caseloads whenever 
possible since fewer cases means fewer hours of work for the already 
overworked public defender.  Conflicts give the defender a ready excuse 
either to decline an appointment of representation, or to withdraw from 
an appointment already made. 
In cases where a defense lawyer has been accused of ineffective 
assistance of counsel and is called upon to testify about decisions made 
during representation, self-interest becomes more obvious.  In such 
circumstances, there is a direct clash between duty and self-interest.  
Like all witnesses, a lawyer has a duty to be forthright and candid while 
testifying. Yet, at the same time, a finding that the lawyer has been 
ineffective can cause the lawyer damage, including casting a shadow on 
the lawyer’s reputation,159 undermining the lawyer’s future earning 
                                                                                                                       
(2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/ 
defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf; Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons 
from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 844 (2004). 
 157. For example, the salary paid to lawyers under the public defender model does not depend 
on the number of clients served.  See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, supra note 156, at 1–2 (stating that 
the public defender model utilizes employees who are paid a salary). 
 158. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 156, at 17 (describing examples of crushing 
caseloads); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 461, 464 (2007) (“Outrageously excessive caseloads have compromised the quality of indigent 
defense representation.”). 
 159. See Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 
52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1186 (2003) (noting that a finding of ineffectiveness would impose a cost on 
the reputation of defense counsel); Siegel, supra note 90, at 86–87 (discussing the conflict between a 
lawyer’s duties as a witness and a lawyer’s own self-interest).  Others have noted that reputation 
may be a lawyer’s most valuable asset, the protection of which will be a lawyer’s highest priority.  
See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 
OHIO ST. L.J. 801, 822 n.96 (2000); Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward 
Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 
1428 n.15 (2004). 
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potential, and exposing the lawyer to possible professional discipline or a 
claim for legal malpractice.160  The result of these incentives on the 
intentional conduct of lawyers is hard to know.  Some suggest that, as a 
result of potential harms, lawyers accused of ineffectiveness will not 
cooperate in post-conviction proceedings, and may even go so far as to 
distort the truth to avoid the various harms of being found ineffective.161  
Indeed, some of these very concerns were raised in Mickens about Bryan 
Saunders, whose pecuniary and reputational interests created an 
incentive for false testimony.162  At the unconscious level, however, the 
research on psychology of conflicts indicates that, because of the 
potential harms that can befall an attorney found to be ineffective, 
defense lawyers will be subject to the types of unconscious biases that 
favor self-interest in post-conviction proceedings. 
In sum, the tensions between self-interest and professional obligation 
identified in the research on conflicts of interest will exist to varying 
degrees.  While some lawyers will be able to act consistent with their 
clients’ interests, many others will be unable to make accurate 
assessments when deciding whether a conflict of interest is present.  In 
                                                     
 160. The connections between a finding of ineffectiveness and other harms to a lawyer’s 
interests have been noted elsewhere.  See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 806 n.11 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the attorney accused of ineffectiveness in that case “is not a 
fully disinterested party to this proceeding due to the collateral consequences that could result from a 
determination that he rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  He certainly has an interest in 
disavowing any conflict of interest so that he may receive other court appointments that are a source 
of clients for the criminal defense work of the partners’ practice.”).  For example, a finding that a 
defense lawyer rendered effective assistance of counsel will, in most jurisdictions, collaterally estop 
a claim for professional malpractice, thus creating an incentive for lawyers to oppose ineffectiveness 
claims.  See Koniak, supra note 90, at 7; Ann M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: 
Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1103, 1126 (1999).  The converse is not true: a finding of ineffectiveness will not, by itself, be 
sufficient to establish malpractice.  Rather, in many jurisdictions, a defendant will need to establish 
actual innocence as a prerequisite to a malpractice claim.  See Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) 
Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 37–38 
(2002). 
 161. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 90, at 7; Voigts, supra note 160, at 1126; Lowenthal, supra 
note 33, at 28; see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003) (“Appellate counsel 
often need trial counsel’s assistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy record on a short deadline, 
but trial counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the 
purpose of understanding how it reflects trial counsel’s own incompetence.”); Cf. Kyle Graham, 
Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1645, 1646–48 (2008) (noting 
that defense attorneys can “sandbag” the final verdict by intentionally engaging in ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 162. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 5, at *33 (noting the difficulty of post hoc assessments 
of “adverse effect,” which is likely to prove to be a “futile attempt to pin down a scared, self-
protective, slippery lawyer, anxious to escape ethical censure at whatever cost to a former client”); 
see also Brief of Legal Ethicists, supra note 21, at *14–15 (arguing that Saunders’s silence about his 
prior representation of the victim was motivated by pecuniary and reputational interests and “defies a 
benign explanation”). 
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addition, all will find it difficult in hindsight to provide an accurate 
assessment about whether a conflict had an adverse effect on the 
representation provided to a client.  Under these circumstances, Part IV 
addresses whether and how current doctrine should be modified to take 
into account these psychological realities. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING DOCTRINE 
The many ways that self-interest can unconsciously influence the 
judgment of defense lawyers requires a fresh look at existing doctrine.  
Given the empirical research on conflicts of interest, what is the best way 
to protect defendants from conflicts while, at the same time, protecting 
the other interests at stake in criminal proceedings?  Options include 
mandating greater disclosure in conflicts cases, limiting the discretion of 
trial courts to grant disqualification motions, prohibiting certain types of 
representation altogether, and changing the burden of proof that 
defendants must meet when a conflict of interest is alleged.  Each of 
these options is discussed below. 
A. Disclosure Requirements 
One option is to require more disclosure about the risks involved 
when circumstances suggest that a conflict of interest exists or is likely.  
This option hypothesizes that a defendant who better understands the 
risks would be better able to decide how to proceed, either by objecting 
to the appointment of an attorney who is paid by public funds or, in the 
case of a private retainer, by hiring new counsel.  The form and 
circumstances under which disclosure is mandated could vary.  For 
example, warnings similar to those mandated by federal law in cases of 
multiple representation163 could be required in every case.  Alternatively, 
a rule could be created requiring trial courts to provide warnings to 
defendants only when, in the court’s estimation, there is sufficient risk of 
a conflict.  Devising an appropriate rule of disclosure might be a 
common sense and relatively non-intrusive way of addressing conflicts 
of interest.164 
                                                     
 163. See supra text of note 29. 
 164. See Daylian M. Cain et al., Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier: The Shortcomings of 
Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest [hereinafter Cain, Coming Clean but Playing 
Dirtier], in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 25, at 107; Daylian  M. Cain et al., The Dirt on 
Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest [hereinafter Cain, The Dirt on 
Coming Clean], 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2005).  For example, many of the regulatory reforms in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which were crafted in response to the corporate scandals associated 
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The problem with disclosure, it turns out, is that conflicts of interest 
are not easily remedied by providing decision-makers with more and 
better information.  According to available research, a series of cognitive 
biases make it difficult for disclosure to counteract the effects of 
conflicting interests.165  Simply put, people tend to rely on biased advice 
even when they should know better.166 
Three explanations have been offered.  First, information that is 
provided at the beginning of the judgmental process has a powerful 
influence on the end result, even when one knows that it comes from a 
biased source.167  This “anchoring effect,” as it is known, suggests that a 
defendant will have a hard time discounting biased advice from a lawyer 
even if the defendant subsequently learns that the lawyer might have a 
conflict of interest.  Of course, in some cases, warnings can be provided 
prior to the appointment of counsel, for example, during the arraignment 
of the defendant, which might reduce this bias.  But in many other 
situations—such as where the attorney-client relationship develops prior 
to the first court appearance or where the reasons to suspect a conflict 
arise only after the lawyer has been working on the case—the anchoring 
effect will counteract warnings issued by the court. 
Second, people tend to have a hard time unlearning information, 
even when they know that the information is incorrect.168  Known as the 
“failure of evidentiary discreditation,” this tendency makes it difficult to 
disregard advice from a biased advisor, even when the decision-maker 
knows that the information is coming from a biased source.  This 
suggests that, even for warnings provided when counsel is appointed, 
subsequent advice from the lawyer will be hard for the defendant to 
discount. 
Third, because people tend to assume that others will act consistent 
with their true nature, known as “correspondence bias,” they have a hard 
                                                                                                                       
with conflicts of interests, focused on mandating greater disclosure to shareholders and investors.  
See Cain, Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier, supra, at 106; see also Page, supra note 109, at 292 
n.404 (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 406(a), 407(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7264(a), 7665(a) 
(2006), which requires “a company to disclose whether it has a code of ethics and a financial expert 
on its audit committee rather than requiring these actions”). 
 165. See Cain, Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier, supra note 164, at 105. 
 166. Id. at 114. 
 167. Id. at 110–11.  For example, in one study participants were asked to estimate the population 
of the United States, but before answering were told a number that was either 50 percent higher or 
50 percent lower than the correct answer.  Id. at 111.  Even though participants were informed that 
the information may have been offered to influence their estimates, they were nonetheless drawn to 
the suggested anchor: those who heard the higher number made significantly higher estimates than 
those who heard the lower number.  Id. at 111–12; see also Cain, The Dirt on Coming Clean, supra 
note 164, at 6. 
 168. See Cain, Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier, supra note 164, at 112–13. 
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time discounting advice from someone who is in a trusted position.169  As 
a result, a defendant might have a hard time discounting advice from a 
lawyer who has been appointed to represent his or her interests, even 
when the defendant knows that a conflict of interest is possible. 
The problem does not end there, however.  Research also 
demonstrates that, far from helping to reduce the dangers caused by 
conflicting interests, disclosure might actually make matters worse.170 
Again, unconscious biases are to blame.  In some situations, advisors 
may “compensate” unconsciously for the effects of disclosure “by further 
skewing their advice” to a client.171  Similarly, once bias is disclosed, the 
decision-maker might unconsciously feel that the advisor has been 
ethical and thus is deserving of more, rather than less, trust.172  Finally, 
disclosure may result in what has been called “moral licensing,” which 
makes the advisor believe that, because the risks have been disclosed, 
there is less reason to “toe the ethical line and look out for the interests of 
those receiving their advice.”173 
Applying this research to criminal cases suggests that mandating 
greater disclosure may have little effect on the quality of decision-
making by defendants.  Indeed, it might even cause some lawyers to push 
harder for waivers of conflicts while, at the same time, making 
defendants more, rather than less, willing to grant them.174  Although 
disclosure in some cases might be beneficial,175 mandating greater 
disclosure does not seem to be the best avenue for resolving the 
complications that arise in conflicts cases. 
                                                     
 169. Id. at 114. 
 170. Id. at 114–16.  See also Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 151, at 252, 254 (describing a 
study where disclosure had the “perverse effects” of making matters worse, not better); M.P. 
Dunleavey, Disclosing Bias Doesn’t Cancel Its Effects, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2007, at C6 (discussing 
same study). 
 171. Cain, Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier, supra note 164, at 115; see Cain, The Dirt on 
Coming Clean, supra note 164, at 7. 
 172. Cain, The Dirt on Coming Clean, supra note 164, at 6 (citing Fiona Lee et al., Mea Culpa: 
Predicting Stock Prices from Organizational Attributions, 30 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1636–49 (2004)). 
 173. See Cain, The Dirt on Coming Clean, supra note 164, at 6. 
 174. This research provides at least some support for the Supreme Court’s assertion in Wheat 
that defense lawyers with conflicts of interest may be inclined to seek waivers from their clients.  See 
supra note 65; see also Gross, supra note 23 (whose study comes to the same conclusion). 
 175. Disclosure might be effective in situations where the risks of conflict are low, the disclosure 
is appropriate, and the capacity of the decision-maker to make informed judgments is strong.  See 
Cain, Coming Clean but Playing Dirtier, supra note 164, at 117. 
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B. Trial Court Discretion 
The decision in Wheat to grant trial courts wide discretion to 
disqualify counsel when conflicts of interest are alleged has drawn 
criticism.176  Much of the concern raised is that too much discretion 
undermines the defendant’s autonomy in choosing counsel and also has 
associated costs, including interference with confidential 
communications between counsel and the defendant, undermining the 
defendant’s faith in counsel, and chilling advocacy on behalf of the 
defendant.177  In addition, courts may not have access to the necessary 
information to decide whether a conflict exists or is likely, especially if 
the basis for the purported conflict comes from information provided to 
defense counsel through confidential communications.178 
These criticisms may be well-founded.  However, the present 
purpose is not to decide whether courts are better suited than defense 
attorneys to address and resolve conflicts, but rather to determine 
whether empirical evidence supports assertions that have been made 
about how defense attorneys respond to conflicting interests.  On that 
question, at least, the empirical data does not provide a basis to disturb 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion granting trial courts discretion in this 
area.179 
C. Prohibit Multiple Representation 
Some have argued that the only viable way to ensure that conflicts of 
interest do not damage defendants, at least in cases of multiple 
                                                     
 176. See, e.g., Green, supra note 22 (criticizing Wheat); see also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to 
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 97 (1991) 
(criticizing Wheat). 
 177. See Green, supra note 22, at 1232. 
 178. Id. at 1230–32 (explaining that much of the information necessary to determine whether a 
conflict is present may be based on confidential communications). 
 179. Research indicates that distancing the person with conflicting duties from the decision on 
whether a conflict exists is the best way to reduce the impact of the conflict, meaning that—all other 
things being equal—a neutral arbiter is in the best position to calculate whether a conflict exists or is 
likely.  See Chugh et al., supra note 25, at 91; see also Gross, supra note 23, at 145 (suggesting 
shifting the decision-making authority away from the lawyer who is subject to a conflict of interest); 
Moore et al., Moral Seduction, supra note 120, at 24 (suggesting solutions to the problems of auditor 
independence, including removing the decision-making responsibility from the person or entity with 
the conflict of interest).  In theory, trial courts should be able to perform this function well.  Practice, 
however, may be very different.  For example, a trial court may be inclined to disqualify counsel, 
even when the risks of divided loyalties are relatively low, as a preventive measure to preserve a 
judgment from attack on appeal.  See Green, supra note 22, at 1240–41 (discussing the institutional 
interests of the judiciary to preserve judgments). 
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representation, is a flat prohibition.180  The disadvantage to this solution, 
of course, is that it denies defendants the right to counsel of choice in 
situations where multiple representation would be beneficial.  As Justice 
Frankfurter noted more than sixty years ago in an oft-repeated passage, 
“[j]oint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal 
recrimination.  A common defense often gives strength against a 
common attack.”181  While these benefits may be outweighed by the risks 
caused by multiple representation, prohibition should be a last resort, to 
be used only when no other alternatives are available.  Fortunately, a 
better choice exists. 
D. Replace the Sullivan “Adverse Effects” Test 
The research on psychology of conflicts of interest indicates that 
many lawyers will underestimate the corrosive effects of a conflict and 
then, when asked to provide an explanation about the decisions made on 
behalf of the defendant, will provide post hoc rationalizations that are 
inconsistent with what really transpired.182  Combined with other 
problems of proof, these systemic biases in judgment raise questions 
about the propriety of the Sullivan adverse effects test in conflicts cases.  
A better approach would be to focus on the risk that there was a conflict 
of interest in the first place, and not on whether the defendant can prove 
that a conflict produced an adverse effect. 
Proving that a conflict of interest caused a specific result is difficult 
even when psychological biases are not factored into the equation.  As 
previously noted, conflicts often cause a lawyer to refrain from acting in 
                                                     
 180. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Basset, Three’s a Crowd: A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 
32 RUTGERS L. J. 387, 393 (2001) (arguing for a per se rule prohibiting joint representation because 
the dangers far outweigh potential benefits); Geer, supra note 30, at 157–62 (proposing that the 
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility be interpreted to prohibit attorneys from representing 
multiple defendants in the same case); Peter W. Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of 
Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L. J. 1075, 1075–76 (1979) (discussing the benefits of 
individual representation and various ways to bring about those benefits). 
 181. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled in 
part by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).  Others have described these benefits.  See, 
e.g., Ephraim Margolin & Sandra Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel, 20 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 227, 251–57 (1982) (discussing the practical and constitutional arguments in 
favor of joint representation).  For an interesting debate about the merits of multiple representation, 
see FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 61, § 11.17 n.190 (discussing a disagreement between the 
coauthors, both eminent scholars, about the propriety of multiple representation in criminal cases—
Freedman believes that multiple representation can sometimes be beneficial to all concerned, 
whereas Smith believes that a single lawyer should never represent multiple defendants in the same 
case). 
 182. See supra notes 109–43 and accompanying text. 
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a manner that would otherwise benefit the defendant,183 yet proving the 
harm caused by such “absence of footprints” is difficult.184  For example, 
in a case of multiple representation, a defendant might allege that a 
conflict of interest discouraged the defense lawyer from seeking a 
favorable plea bargain out of loyalty to other defendants.  In such a 
situation, the defendant would need to prove that defense counsel should 
have been more aggressive in seeking a favorable plea bargain and that 
the failure to do so was caused by conflicting duties.185  Evidence to 
support these claims might be obvious—for example, if the defense 
attorney failed to engage in any plea negotiations on behalf of the 
defendant when under the circumstances any competent defense attorney 
would have done so.  But what about a case where the alleged failure is 
more subtle?  It is much harder to prove that a defense attorney, who did 
negotiate on behalf of the defendant, did not do so aggressively enough, 
or that an attorney who did investigate and sought exculpatory evidence 
did not do so vigorously enough.  Recreating what would have, or should 
have, occurred had the defendant received conflict-free representation is 
not easy, even assuming that the evidence to prove these claims is readily 
available.186 
                                                     
 183. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489–90 (1978). 
 184. See id. at 491; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356–57 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the difficulty in proving an adverse effect from 
“‘what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing’” (quoting Holloway, 435 U.S. at 
490–91)); Green, supra note 22, at 1207 n.29. 
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 323 F.3d 445, 468 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n order to prevail on 
a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner alleging that a conflict of interest prevented his attorney 
from exploring plea negotiations must demonstrate (1) there was a conflict of interest; and (2) that 
the conflict of interest prevented the attorney from exploring plea negotiations.”); Ruffin v. Kemp, 
767 F.2d 748, 751–52 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (finding reversible error where counsel who 
represented co-defendants failed to negotiate a plea bargain on behalf of one defendant because of 
duties owed to another defendant).  In addition, some courts require proof that the prosecution would 
have been willing to offer a better deal than defense counsel obtained.  See, e.g., Goldsby v. United 
States, 152 F. App’x 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2005); Moss, 323 F.3d at 468; Jones v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
No. 8:04-cv-1930-T-24MSS, 2008 WL 906653, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2008).  But see United 
States v. Williams, 372 F.3d 96, 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that defendant need not prove that the 
government would have offered a plea deal, when there is sufficient evidence that defense counsel 
who had an actual conflict of interest did not make any significant efforts to negotiate a plea bargain 
on the defendant’s behalf). 
 186. The difficulty of proof has caused others to criticize the adverse effects test, including 
Justice Marshall, who stated in Sullivan that a test requiring a defendant “to demonstrate that his 
attorney’s trial performance differed from what it would have been if the defendant had been the 
attorney’s only client . . . is not only unduly harsh, but incurably speculative as well.”  Sullivan, 446 
U.S. at 355 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Gary Lowenthal provides 
another example, one that could occur in the case of successive representation where the defense 
attorney previously represented a prosecution witness.  Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 33–34.  Say, for 
example, the defense attorney thoroughly cross-examined the prosecution’s witness and avoided 
only one area of examination—the area that concerned confidential information gleaned from the 
prior representation of the prosecution witness.  Id.  In such circumstances, even if the transcript 
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These problems of proof are substantially worse when the 
psychological biases of the defense attorney are considered.  For 
example, in the case of multiple representation just described, if the 
defense attorney in good faith believes that additional plea negotiations 
would have been fruitless, and testifies to that effect at the post-
conviction hearings, disproving that claim will be almost impossible.  To 
be sure, the defendant might be able to get the defense attorney to admit 
that more investigation could have been conducted, and might even be 
able to demonstrate that uncovering additional facts could have been 
helpful in plea negotiations, but that would be insufficient.  The 
defendant will still need to prove that the conflict of interest caused the 
attorney’s inaction.187  The attorney whose conduct is under review can 
be expected to resist this conclusion because of an inability to perceive 
the unconscious biases that influence judgment.  Introspection into 
automatic bias is just not possible.188  Because the defense attorney’s 
testimony will be the most probative evidence available, the 
psychological biases that discount conflicts of interest will make it much 
harder for the defendant to prove that the conflict caused an adverse 
effect on representation provided. 
Mickens again provides a good illustration of these problems.  Justice 
Kennedy emphasized in his opinion that Bryan Saunders believed that he 
had no continuing duty of confidentiality to the victim and that, as a 
result, Mickens could not prove that any of the alleged errors in 
representation resulted from a conflict of interest.189  One can never 
know for certain whether psychological biases caused Saunders to 
miscalculate the influence of his prior representation on decisions made 
while representing Mickens.  Saunders might have been one of those rare 
                                                                                                                       
suggests a “lengthy and vigorous” cross-examination, the decision to avoid only one subject may 
still deny the defendant a “fair opportunity for acquittal.  Yet proving that a conflict of interest 
caused the lawyer’s conduct will be difficult, especially since there may have been other tactical 
reasons unrelated to the conflict that can explain the lawyer’s decisions.”  Id. 
 187. See cases cited supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 188. Indeed, the research reveals that people are unable to control subconscious biases even 
when they are aware of them.  Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 197, 249 (2008) (citing Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 114, 117 (1980)); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental 
Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 125–26 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)).  This is not to say that attorneys 
can never identify or testify accurately about conflicts of interest.  As the Sullivan remand 
demonstrates, when a conflict is obvious, an attorney can and will be able to explain that the conflict 
had an adverse effect on the decisions made during trial.  See cases cited supra notes 92–95 and 
accompanying text.  It is in the closer cases, when the impact of a conflict is not so apparent, where 
the defense attorney will be more likely to provide post hoc rationalizations that understate the 
likelihood of a conflict or its corrosive effects. 
 189. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 177–79 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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people who, through the sheer power of moral reasoning, was able to 
overcome his unconscious biases.190  Given his ethical limitations,191 
however, it is more likely that he provided a post hoc rationalization to 
justify his own behavior.  If so, he would have underestimated both the 
likelihood of conflict at the time he decided to accept representation of 
Mickens and also when testifying about these matters after conviction.  
Mickens was placed in the untenable position of trying to undermine 
unconscious biases, a burden he could not meet. 
Given these proof problems, it is not surprising that there are only a 
small number of reported decisions in which defendants are able to meet 
the Sullivan adverse effects test.192  One explanation is that conflicts 
rarely infect criminal proceedings.  But the research on psychological 
biases provides an alternative and more likely explanation: the Sullivan 
adverse effects test erects too high a barrier in conflicts cases, meaning 
that many conflicts are never identified because of problems of proof, not 
because they do not exist. 
A better approach, which will help reduce the effect of psychological 
biases in criminal cases, is to focus on the degree of risk that a conflict 
existed.  This alternative test, which would be named the “substantial 
risk” test, borrows from modern ethical rules that focus on risk, not  
 
                                                     
 190. The Emotional Dog, supra note 128, at 819 (discussing instances where rational 
deliberation can overcome unconscious bias). 
 191. See case cited supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 192. Calculating the success rate of claims based on conflicts of interest is difficult, as there is 
no central source that collects data from the myriad of federal and state courts where prosecutions 
take place and then synthesizes it according to type of claim asserted.  But there should be little 
dispute that few claims alleging ineffectiveness due to a conflict of interest are successful.  The most 
exhaustive data set available on successful ineffectiveness claims is compiled by the Capital 
Defender Network, a program of the Office of Defender Services of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts.  According to the Network’s report on all published opinions of successful 
ineffectiveness claims (from 1982 to 2004), there have been only a few hundred successful claims in 
both state and federal courts where the defendant alleged a conflict of interest.  See TERESA L. 
NORRIS, SUMMARIES OF ALL PUBLISHED SUCCESSFUL CONFLICT OF INTEREST CLAIMS SINCE 1982 
(2004), http://www.capdefnet.org/hat/contents/constitutional_issues/conflict/conflict_frame.htm (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2009).  In contrast, during the same period there were an excess of 300,000 petitions 
for habeas corpus seeking relief from state and federal convictions filed in the United States District 
Courts.  Albany.edu, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Table 5.65, http://www.albany.edu 
/sourcebook/pdf/t5652007.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).  Ineffective assistance of counsel is the 
most frequently raised basis for habeas relief.  ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W. K. DALEY, BUREAU 
OF JUST. STAT., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS v (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf.  Even if 
only a fraction of the habeas claims filed alleged a conflict of interest as a basis for relief, the ratio of 
successful claims to claims made would still be extremely small.  The ratio would be even smaller if 
the number of claims alleging a conflict of interest in state courts was factored into the equation; 
unfortunately, no such source of data is available. 
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result.193  It also seeks to enforce the duty of inquiry imposed when a trial 
court knows or should know that a conflict is present.194 
Under the substantial risk test, a defendant who is seeking a new trial 
based on a conflict of interest would be required to meet the same 
standard of proof as set forth in the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, meaning that the defendant must establish that, based on the 
information that was known to defense counsel at the time, there was “a 
substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation” of the defendant “would 
be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by 
the lawyer’s duties to another current client, a former client, or a third 
person.”195  If the defendant can prove that such risk existed, then a 
conflict has been established and the defendant’s conviction should be 
reversed without requiring the defendant to prove also that the conflict 
had an adverse effect on the representation provided.196 
Focusing on the degree of risk before conviction will help alleviate 
some of the problems of proof in conflicts cases.  Post-conviction 
proceedings will still be necessary in most cases, but the focus will be on 
proving the risk of conflict, rather than whether the conflict had an 
impact on decisions made during representation.  For example, in a case 
of multiple representation, a defendant could demonstrate a conflict by 
proving that the defendants had antagonistic defenses that could not be 
advocated simultaneously, which by itself would raise sufficient risk of 
conflict.  The defendant would no longer also need to prove that the 
antagonistic defenses resulted in any adverse effect in decisions made 
during the representation. 
In addition, the substantial risk test will make the testimony of 
defense counsel less important.  For example, on the issue of consent in 
Mickens, the focus would have been on what a competent attorney would 
have done, given the information known at the time, to investigate the 
                                                     
 193. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 194. For a discussion of the duty of inquiry, see supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 196. The amicus brief filed by experts in legal ethics in Mickens proposed a similar test.  Brief of 
Legal Ethicists, supra note 21, at *9 (arguing for an “objective test,” which asks “did the lawyer 
have other interests that posed a substantial risk of materially and adversely affecting the 
representation?”).  Similarly, Gary Lowenthal has suggested a variation on this test, but limited only 
to situations of successive representation.  Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 36.  In his view, defense 
attorneys should be required to report any prior representation of a prosecution witness to the trial 
judge.  Id.  If the defense attorney fails to do so, then the defendant should be permitted to obtain 
relief from the conviction by showing that the prior representation of the witness was substantially 
related to the representation of the defendant, irrespective of whether the prior representation of the 
witness caused any harm to the defendant.  Id.  My proposal expands this test to all cases where the 
defendant can prove there was sufficient risk of a conflict, as defined by the Restatement. 
ELDRED FINAL 10/29/2009  4:57:18 PM 
86 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
defense.  What evidence was there to suggest a consent defense?  Were 
there reasonable investigative leads that could have been pursued to help 
prove the defense?  Would a competent lawyer in Saunders’s position 
have been expected to use information gained during the representation 
of the victim in such an investigation, yet been constrained to do so 
because of the prior representation of the victim?  Proving that a non-
conflicted lawyer would have investigated the consent defense would go 
a long way to meet this burden.197  Mickens would not have been 
obligated to go further, as required by Sullivan, to prove that the reason 
that Saunders failed to pursue the consent defense was because he had 
previously represented the victim—thus eliminating the need for 
Saunders’s subjective assessment of his own reasons for his own 
conduct.  Rather, the inquiry would be an objective assessment of the 
risks that existed prior to conviction. 
Of course, substituting the degree of risk for the adverse effects test 
will not eliminate the need for testimony from defense attorneys.  Rather, 
to prove the degree of risk, the defendant will often need to call the 
attorney whose conduct is under review.  But the questions posed to the 
defense attorney would likely focus more on the historical facts of 
representation, and less on explanations for why certain decisions were 
made.  For example, if the question before the reviewing court is whether 
multiple representation caused a defense attorney to forgo a favorable 
plea bargain, the defense attorney might need to testify about whether 
plea negotiations took place and whether the prosecutor made any 
favorable offers, but would not need to explain whether the 
circumstances that led to the alleged conflict caused the defense 
attorney’s conduct.  In all likelihood, if the defense attorney represented 
multiple clients with differing defenses, and failed to engage in 
meaningful plea negotiations on behalf of the defendant when such 
negotiations would have been expected, then the risk would be sufficient 
to warrant relief, irrespective of the explanations that the defense 
attorney proffered.  By eliminating a focus on the defense attorney’s own 
assessment of his or her conduct, the substantial risk test will reduce the 
influence of unconscious biases that have been identified in this Article. 
                                                     
 197. There is certainly reason to believe that Saunders failed to investigate a consent defense 
because of his prior representation of the victim.  As previously noted, much of the evidence 
concerning a possible consent defense turned on whether the victim was a male prostitute.  See case 
cited supra note 8 and accompanying text.  To investigate this claim, a non-conflicted lawyer would 
have been expected to pursue all reasonable leads, including investigating and revealing the victim’s 
criminal record.  Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 610 (E.D. Va. 1999).  However, Saunders 
could not pursue such an investigation without revealing that he had represented the victim on 
criminal charges, information that he seemed determined to keep secret.  See id. at 599–601. 
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A number of questions are raised by this proposal.  The first is 
whether a defendant should receive a new trial if it can be established 
that the risk of a conflict before conviction was sufficiently great to meet 
the substantial risk test, but the trial court did not have reason to know of 
the circumstances that led to that risk.  For example, in a case of 
successive representation where the defense attorney had previously 
represented either the victim or one of the prosecution’s witnesses, the 
defense attorney may have failed to disclose any information about the 
prior representation to either the defendant or the trial court.  If the 
defendant learns of the prior representation after conviction, and brings a 
collateral challenge based on that claim, should the defendant receive a 
new trial? 
The argument against granting a new trial, at least in the absence of 
proof of an adverse effect, is that the trial court did not know, nor had 
reason to know, that a conflict might be present and therefore could not 
have prevented it.  The opposite argument is that the defendant deserves 
loyalty from defense counsel, and the trial court’s knowledge should be 
irrelevant in making that decision.  Between these two options, the latter 
view is better: the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to protect the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial in all cases, even when no blame can be 
cast on the trial court.  If the defendant can establish that a conflict 
existed, it should not matter that the trial court was not in a position to 
prevent it. 
Second, some will argue that the substantial risk test will allow 
defendants to obtain new trials too frequently, thus undermining finality 
of judgments in too many cases.198  This will only be a problem if 
defendants receive new trials in cases where a conflict of interest had no 
measurable influence on decisions made during representation.  There 
are reasons to be cautiously optimistic that such cases will be few: to 
begin with, because psychological biases are systematic, their corrosive 
effects on judgment and decision-making will occur in most cases.199  At 
the very least, whenever circumstances create a substantial risk of a 
material and adverse limitation in representation, there will be a similar 
risk that the lawyer’s judgment will be influenced in some significant 
respect.  The danger of opening a floodgate of unwarranted reversals, 
therefore, will be minimal.  In addition, the proposed test will create an 
incentive for trial courts to ferret out conflicts of interest whenever 
                                                     
 198. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (discussing the importance of finality in criminal 
cases). 
 199. See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text. 
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possible.  Knowing that a verdict would be susceptible to reversal when 
there is sufficient risk of a conflict, trial courts will have an incentive to 
identify and resolve conflicts before conviction.200  The proposed test 
may act as a prophylactic, resulting in fewer rather than more cases in 
which convictions need to be reversed.  As a result, the proposed test is 
not likely to produce a windfall for undeserving defendants; rather, it is 
more likely to result in a more accurate way of determining how conflicts 
do, in fact, influence decision-making in criminal cases. 
Finally, because the new test might cause trial courts to err on the 
side of finding conflicts in ambiguous cases as a way to preserve 
judgments from attack, there will be some instances where a defendant’s 
right to choose his or her own counsel will be compromised.  Trial courts 
can minimize this danger by making sure that any circumstances that can 
give rise to a conflict are addressed as early as possible in a proceeding 
to minimize the damage caused by a disqualification motion.  In 
addition, courts must take care not to allow disqualification motions to be 
used as a gambit to undermine the defendant’s choice of counsel.201  
However, even with these precautions, there may be cases where an 
alleged conflict results in unfair disqualification of counsel.  If so, the 
result will only be replacement of counsel by a new attorney who is 
conflict-free.  This price is worth it for a system that returns better results 
in determining when conflicts of interest are present.202 
In sum, the substantial risk test should help reviewing courts make 
better assessments about whether a lawyer had a conflict of interest.  
While it will not eliminate the problems of proof that have been 
identified, it will help reduce the psychological biases that make it 
difficult for a defendant to prove violations of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel.  The net result should be more 
accurate assessments of how conflicts do, in fact, influence decision-
making in criminal cases. 
                                                     
 200. This is the same incentive created by Holloway v. Arkansas, which encourages the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest before they arise.  See Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 41–42. 
 201. Appellate courts will, of course, need to continue to monitor disqualification decisions to 
make sure that trial courts do not abuse their discretion in granting disqualification motions.  See, 
e.g., Hanna v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that trial court erred in 
disqualifying counsel where the prosecution objected to joint representation); Ex parte Tegner, 682 
So.2d 396, 398 (Ala. 1996) (finding that trial court erred in disqualifying defense counsel in murder 
case without sufficient inquiry to determine whether counsel’s previous representation of an 
eyewitness constituted a conflict of interest). 
 202. This is not to say that there will be no cost to requiring replacement counsel. See 
Lowenthal, supra note 33, at 25 n.85 (discussing some of the costs that a client might incur, 
including the additional expense of hiring new counsel and the additional work that new counsel will 
need to do to become familiar with the client’s case). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Conflicts of interest exert subtle psychological influence on 
judgment and decision-making.  Empirical research demonstrates that 
lawyers, like all professionals, are subject to psychological biases that 
make it difficult to be objective when balancing self-interest with duties 
to others.  The results are systematic errors of judgment that favor self-
interest. 
Applying psychological research to criminal cases reveals that many 
of the claims about how defense lawyers allegedly respond to conflicts of 
interest are incorrect.  Contrary to assumptions that have been made, 
defense lawyers are not well-suited to evaluate conflicts that can and do 
arise during criminal proceedings.  Similarly, they tend to be poor judges 
of whether a conflict of interest had a corrosive effect on decisions made 
during representation. 
Given the evidence, current doctrine should be re-evaluated to better 
align existing legal rules with how lawyers actually behave when 
conflicts are present or likely.  The Supreme Court’s conclusion in 
Wheat, which granted trial courts substantial latitude in making 
disqualification decisions, is consistent with the results of the 
psychological research.  While there may be other valid reasons to 
critique the degree of discretion courts possess to disqualify lawyers, the 
available empirical evidence is not one of them.  In contrast, given the 
inability of defense lawyers to make accurate assessments about their 
own behavior, the Sullivan adverse effects test for determining whether a 
defendant received effective assistance of counsel erects too high a 
barrier of proof.  A better test would emphasize the degree of risk that 
existed before conviction.  Under the proposed substantial risk test, a 
new trial would be required if a defendant can prove, based on the facts 
known before conviction, that there was a substantial risk that the 
defense lawyer’s representation “would be materially and adversely 
affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to 
another current client, a former client, or a third person.”203 
                                                     
 203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2001). 
